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The availability of prenatal testing and abortion on demand will
soon present American society with a peculiar problem that is likely
to produce uncommon bedfellows: anti-abortionists and some femi-
nists may unite in seeking the same statutory restrictions on these
procedures.1 This article will show why legislatures are morally jus-
tified in enacting such restrictions and suggest how statutes can be
couched so as to comport with the procreative rights announced in
Roe v. Wade.2 This introduction will briefly explain the problem and
present the organization of the arguments within the article.
Pregnant women are presently able to discover the sex of their fe-
* The topic of this paper was first suggested to me by Professor Richard Delgado
of the University of California at Davis School of Law, and I am indebted to him for
the structure of the argument in Part IVA. See Delgado & Keyes, Parental
Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton,
and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASHINGTON U.L.Q. 203. I am also grateful for
comments from Professor James Sterba of the Philosophy Department at Notre Dame,
from Professors Thomas McAffee and Norman Vieira at the Southern Illinois
University School of Law, from Marsha Ryan, M.D., J.D., and from Carol Jackson,
Esq.
t Professor of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. J.D.,
Southern Illinois University School of Law, Carbondale, 1987; PhD., University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego, 1973; M.A., University of California, San Diego, 1970; B.A., Saint
Mary's, College of California, 1967.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 41-43.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The reader will note that one can adhere to the trimester
analysis of Roe and still find these restrictions constitutional. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 132-41. Those who view the Roe viability standard as conflicting with its
trimester division will, of course, not even pause to consider whether prohibitions on
sex-selection abortion conflict with Roe. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
tuses by availing themselves of amniocentesis. 3 Women who prefer
firstborn male children may choose to follow amniocentesis by abor-
tion if the fetus is discovered to be female. 4 The available evidence
indicates that a substantial minority of American women would avail
themselves of gender selection techniques5 and would prefer male
over female children.6 . Although the precise percentage of women
who are likely to utilize abortion for gender selection is uncertain,
the use of amniocentesis and abortion for gender selection by even a
minority of women is likely to lead to serious social dislocation,
namely, imbalance in the proportion of males to females,7 more vio-
lent crime,8 and more discrimination against women.9 States should,
therefore, enact legislation prohibiting physicians from disclosing the
gender of the fetus to pregnant women when that knowledge is not
needed to predict a sex-linked genetic defect.1o Also, states should
3. Amniocentesis involves the insertion of a needle into the amniotic cavity, re-
moval of some amniotic fluid, and analysis of the fluid to obtain information about the
medical condition of the fetus. 4B R. GRAY & L. GORDY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF
MEDICINE 305-28, 305.13(5) (3d ed. 1986). To ensure that the fetus or its placenta is
not penetrated, ultrasound may be used to determine their locations.
4. See infra text accompanying note 35.
5. See infra notes 29, 35-37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
7. Sex-selection abortion enables couples who desire to have a firstborn son to re-
alize this goal by simply aborting female fetuses, rather than continuing to "try" to
have a son after the births of several daughters. If this were practiced by even a sub-
stantial minority of American couples, the size of the female population would dimin-
ish. See Wikler, Society's Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: The
Feminist Perspective?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (1986), (citing Holmes & Hoskins,
Prenatal and Preconception Sex Choice Technologies: A Path to Femicide (Paper
presented at Second International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women, Gronigen,
Neth., Apr. 17-21, 1984)).
8. More crimes are perpetrated by males than by females. See infra note 31.
Therefore, all things being equal, more crimes would occur if there were a greater pro-
portion of males to females as the population remains stable or increases. It should be
noted that although this is a broad generalization, it is based upon the assumptions
that not only will women in general avail themselves of this technique, but that wo-
men of all classes will do so. Although the abortion procedure was utilized primarily
by wealthy women before it was legalized by Roe, increasingly greater numbers of
lower income women have availed themselves of the procedure. B. BRODY, ABORTION
AND THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE 55 (1975) (citing Population and the American Fu-
ture (New York: Commission on Population Growth and the American Future) 175
(1972)). As a result, it is likely that women of all income levels will utilize amni-
ocentesis to gain the information necessary to determine the sex of their fetuses,
thereby allowing them the option of aborting the pregnancy based upon this
information.
9. See Wikler, supra note 7, at 1045-46.
10. The more accurate term here is "x-linked recessive inheritance," which refers
to certain conditions, such as hemophilia A, where the blood fails to clot normally,
which most commonly arises in male offspring. Females, although rarely affected,
may be "carriers," i.e., they can pass the condition on to their sons. J. THOMPSON & M.
THOMPSON, GENETICS IN MEDICINE 70-71 (1980). Besides hemophilia, other x-linked ge-
netic disorders include Duchenne muscular dystrophy and fragile x syndrome (a form
of retardation). Id. at 71; Turner, Robinson, Laing & Purvis-Smith, Preventive Screen-
ing for the Fragile X Syndrome, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 607-09 (1986). Until recently,
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follow the State of Illinois' lead and prohibit physicians from per-
forming abortions on women who seek them solely to control the
gender of their children."1 Both legislative solutions will, of course,
encounter constitutional objections. However, as will be demon-
strated in this article, these constitutional objections to interference
with the availability of abortions and the doctor-patient relationship
can be overcome.
The arguments presented below are undoubtedly familiar to liber-
als and feminists who support the justifications for "benign sex dis-
crimination."12  However, the unique factual circumstances
surrounding the sex-selection abortion problem may obscure the fa-
miliarity of the arguments presented in this Article. To clarify mat-
ters, we might imagine a situation in which men had the power, by
consuming certain chemicals, for example, to produce sperm cells
containing only Y chromosomes-thus ensuring all their offspring
would be male. Some feminists might feel justified in proposing re-
strictions on men's freedom to reproduce in this way, in order to
spare future generations of women from the oppression that would
surely follow. This would be a form of benign sex discrimination of
the clearest sort; i.e., the reproductive freedom of one sex is re-
stricted to compensate or protect future members of the disadvan-
taged sex.
The proposals offered in this Article have the same goals; the dif-
ference, however, is that I propose restricting the reproductive free-
dom of some members of the disadvantaged sex to compensate many
more members of the same sex. To the extent that men participate
in creating imbalances in future generations, they too will be pun-
ished, but those most frequently disadvantaged under the statutes
will probably be women.13
prenatal testing could not disclose whether the fetus had contracted any of these con-
ditions. Instead, fetal gender was determined, and the couple made the decision to
abort or carry to term, based on the probability that the fetus would be normal. How-
ever, modern advancements in prenatal testing have obviated the need for such guess-
work. E.g., id.; Letters to the Editor, 37 NEUROLOGY 355-56 (1987) (prenatal diagnosis
of Duchenne muscular dystrophy).
11. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26 § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
12. "Benign sex discrimination" refers to the unequal treatment a statute bestows
on the sexes, whether due to explicit gender classifications or to disparate effects by
disproportionately burdening males in order to compensate females for past discrimi-
nation or to reduce future discrimination. See generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.23, at
535-36 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
13. See infra note 37 and text accompanying notes 153-55.
I have organized my argument in the following way: In the first
part, I discuss the sociological evidence about attitudes toward sex-se-
lection and abortion and conclude that prospective mothers (and fa-
thers) would be willing to abort female fetuses to have male firstborn
children and that adverse psychological and social consequences
would result from a failure to restrict sex-selection abortion. I then
reject the view that the practice should be restricted regardless of
these consequences and explain the view that these consequences
constitute a moral justification for prohibiting sex-selection abortion.
In the second part I consider the constitutional objections to
prohibiting the doctor from communicating the sex of the fetus to
the mother and conclude that privacy and free speech considerations
would be insufficient to invalidate such a prohibition suitably circum-
scribed to allow for certain exceptions. I point out, however, that it is
not clear that the first amendment leaves the doctor's communication
entirely unprotected.
In the third part, I discuss the constitutionality of a statute forbid-
ding physicians from performing an abortion when the mother seeks
the abortion solely because she does not desire a child of the sex of
her fetus. My conclusion is that this restriction on abortion would
withstand attack on constitutional grounds. In the last part of this
Article, I offer some reflections on the constitutionality of similar re-
strictions on preconception gender determination techniques that
might be developed in the future.
II. THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PROHIBITING
SEX-SELECTION ABORTION
In evaluating the constitutional objections to restrictions on wo-
men's procreative rights, the interests of the parents must be bal-
anced against the state's interests which are furthered by the
restrictions.14 To understand the state's interests, we must examine
the evidence concerning the desire of American women and couples
to control the gender of their children, and their willingness to avail
themselves of amniocentesis and abortion to achieve such control.
Initially, however, the potential effects of sex-selection abortion will
be addressed. It will become clear that unregulated use of abortion
and amniocentesis is likely to jeopardize equal opportunity for future
generations of women.
14. Reproductive rights fall within the constitutional right to privacy, and statutes
restricting such rights are subject to "strict scrutiny," a constitutional test requiring
the state to demonstrate a "compelling" interest advanced by the statute which is nar-
rowly tailored to advance that end. See generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.26, at
554-93.
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A. The Sociological Predictions
Two sociological predictions must be understood in order to fully
appreciate the threat that sex-selection abortion poses to American
women. First, if there were a greater proportion of male firstborn
and "only-children" in the population, American women would be
likely to suffer more discrimination and generally lead more un-
happy lives. The second prediction is that the proportion of male
firstborns (and male only-children) would increase because of the
willingness of American women to use sex selection abortion to en-
sure a male, firstborn child. There are, of course, certain contingen-
cies which could prove the sociological claims wrong. Before
discussing those possibilities, however, the basis for these primary so-
ciological predictions will be discussed.
1. More firstborn sons would cause greater unhappiness
for women.
An increase in the number of firstborn sons over firstborn daugh-
ters would adversely affect women in several ways. First, women
would be less likely to acquire the education and training needed to
secure comparable employment; second, they would be less likely to
secure employment comparable to men even if properly trained; and
third, apart from suffering from the effects of heightened job dis-
crimination and decreased motivation to succeed, a higher number of
women would suffer the general disadvantages that laterborn chil-
dren are destined to suffer.
a. Firstborn children are more likely to "succeed"
than laterborns.
Firstborn children, regardless of sex, are more likely to be
"achievers" than laterborns,15 largely because "first born children are
thought to be more assertive, independent, and achievement ori-
ented."'16 Studies show that the larger the family and the later in the
birth order a child is situated, the lower the child's overall intellec-
15. Westoff & Rindfuss, Sex Preselection in the United States: Some Implications,
184 Sci. 633, 636 (1974) (the conclusions of this article are based on data obtained from
the 1970 National Fertility Study by Norman B. Ryden and Charles F. Westoff of the
Office of Population Research, Princeton University). Socio-psychological studies indi-
cate that firstborn children are more readily influenced by their social environment
and are therefore more likely to achieve higher educational and economic goals.
16. Dixon & Levy, Sex of Children: A Community Analysis of Preferences and
Predetermination Attitudes, 26 SOc. Q. 251, 268 (1985).
tual development will be 17 and, in particular, the lower the child's
verbal development will be at high school age.' 8 The explanation for
this is that the quality of the intellectual climate in the family deteri-
orates as the number of younger and less mentally developed siblings
increases. 19
b. The presence of more males who are firstborn or only-children
would deprive women of significant opportunities.
As one would expect, there are researchers who disagree with the
finding that priority in birth order confers such advantages. 20 How-
ever, theorists who believe birth order is significant have found the
skeptics' research to be flawed.2 1 There is research indicating that,
should there be increasing numbers of firstborn males or males who
are only-children, coupled with decreasing numbers of firstborn fe-
males, prospects for women would be dim. Specifically, research
shows more men would have a higher academic self-concept, fewer
women would distinguish themselves academically, and more men
would be less willing to accept women as managers. One study has
shown that academic self-concept is highest among males who are
only-children.22 Another study shows that firstborn women are over-
represented among students receiving honors at the undergraduate
levels, while this is not so for males.23 A third study shows firstborn
17. Belmont & Marolla, Birth Order, Family Size and Intelligence, 182 Sci. 1096
(1973) (this study involved a Dutch population of some 400,000 19-year-old boys). One
study showed firstborns tend to "overachieve" relative to second-borns, even when sec-
ond-borns are intellectually more gifted. Pfouts, Birth Order, Age-Spacing, I.Q. Differ-
ences, and Family Relations, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 517 (1980).
18. Breland, Birth Order, Family Conkfiguration and Verbal Achievement, 45
CHILD DEV. 1011 (1974).
19. Zajonc & Markus, Birth Order and Intellectual Development, 82 PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL REV. 74, 76 (1975).
20. E.g., Galbraith, Individual Differences in Intelligence: A Reappraisal of the
Confluence Model, 7 INTELLIGENCE 185 (1983); Gecas & Pasley, Birth Order and Self-
Concept in Adolescence, 12 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 521 (1983); Hauser & Sewell,
Birth Order and Educational Attainment in Full Sibships, 22 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 1
(1985); Steelman, A Tale of Two Variables: A Review of the Intellectual Consequences
of Sibship Size and Birth Order, 55 REV. EDUC. RES. 353 (1985). Among philosophers,
Mary Anne Warren has dismissed the birth order theory as "empirically unsubstanti-
ated or devoid of predictive power." M. WARREN, GENDERCIDE 142 (1985). Contra, in-
fra notes 21-25.
21. The theorist who defends the relation between birth order and intellectual
achievement explains that contradictory results in other studies are due to other re-
searchers' failure to take into account the intellectual level of parents. Zajonc, Vali-
dating the Confuence Model, 93 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 457, 463-64 (1983). Zajonc
admits that a study of Mormon families contradicted his theory, but he found socioeco-
nomic factors unique to Mormon families that explained this result. Id. at 468-69.
22. Griffore & Bianchi, Effects of Ordinal Position on Academic Self Concept, 55
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 263 (1984).
23. Finlay, Birth Order, Sex, and Honors Students' Status in a State University, 49
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1000 (1981).
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males have the least favorable attitude toward women as managers. 24
These results suggest that, in a world consisting largely of
secondborn daughters, firstborn sons, and only-children who are
males, even well-trained and educated women (who would be fewer
in number) would face increased competition from more achieve-
ment-oriented males and would confront greater discrimination in
their search for managerial positions.
c. Other effects.
Apart from an enhanced struggle for equality in education and em-
ployment opportunities, women would face other untoward effects
due to the dwindling number of firstborns in their ranks. For exam-
ple, a higher female infant mortality rate could be expected because
research shows that high-risk, laterborn infants receive less maternal
stimulation than firstborns.25 If more premature or sick laterborns
are female, their prospects for survival would be dimmer than males'.
Women would suffer this disadvantage not because of male chauvin-
ism or any inherent advantages male infants enjoy, but simply be-
cause a greater proportion of women would be laterborn daughters.
2. Availability of sex-selection abortion would increase the
proportion of sons who are firstborn and only-children.
Of course, none of these studies would be cause for alarm if there
were no evidence to indicate that couples are likely to use prenatal
testing and abortion to predict and determine the sex of their chil-
dren. However, American women and couples undoubtedly prefer to
have firstborn sons.26 One somewhat dated study of American wives
showed that they are much more likely to prefer a firstborn son to a
daughter.27 A more recent study of college students shows that
eighty-one percent of the women and ninety-four percent of the men
24. Beutell, Correlates of Attitudes Toward American Women as Managers, 124 J.
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 57 (1984).
25. Bendersky & Lewis, The Impact of Birth Order on Mother-Infant Interactions
in Preterrn and Sick Infants, 7 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATR. 242 (1986). "First-time
mothers generally spend more time stimulating, caregiving, and interacting with their
infants than multiparous mothers." Id.
26. Coombs, Preferences for Sex of Children Among U.S. Couples, 9 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 259 (1977); Pharis & Manosevitz, Parental Models of Infancy: A Note on Gender
Preferences for Firstborns, 47 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 763, 766 (1980); Steinbacher,
Preselection of Sex: The Social Consequences of Choice, 20 ScI. 6 (1980); Westoff &
Rindfuss, supra note 15, at 636.
27. Coombs, supra note 26, at 259 (In 1973 a U.S. National Survey of Family
Growth study found that "about one-half of married women have an underlying pref-
surveyed preferred a firstborn son.28 Among those surveyed, about
23-24% of the college men and women indicated they would use
preselection techniques. 29 If this became true generally, the propor-
tion of males to females in the population would increase.
Use of these techniques would also diminish the absolute number
of women in the population because couples who are desirous of a
firstborn son would simply preselect the first child's sex rather than
continue to "try" to have a son after the births of several daughters.30
If these predictions are correct, and if the use of sex-selection abor-
tion becomes more widespread, men would greatly outnumber wo-
men in the next generation. Even if societal preference for male
children should swing the other way in the following generation, so-
ciety would be asked to accommodate these fluctuations and to pay
the price for this widespread and erratic use of reproductive technol-
ogy. In particular, American women would pay the price for even a
temporary imbalance in the ratio of men to women, since the likely
results would not only include the increased job discrimination and
developmental difficulties just discussed, but also an increase in vio-
lent crime31 and prostitution,32 and would certainly dilute voting
power for women.33 The only question is whether these untoward
erence for sons, one-third prefer daughters and only one-fifth have a clear preferrence
for balance."). Id.
28. Id. Contra Dixon & Levy, supra note 16, at 269. The findings of the study
were based upon a self-administered questionnaire distributed to 309 adults. The aim
was to determine attitudes concerning gender preferences of prospective children.
This study was published in 1985.
29. Gilroy & Steinbacher, Preselection of Child's Sex: Technological Utilization
and Feminism, 53 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 671, 675 (1983).
30. See Wikler, supra note 7, at 1045 n.6.
31. Arrests of males in the United States for violent crimes in 1985 exceeded ar-
rests of females by a factor of greater than 8 to 1. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 181 (1985). Assuming the
disproportionate number of arrests of males indicates that a disproportionate number
of crimes are perpetrated by men, it follows that the number of crimes commited
would increase as the numbers of men increased. The reader should note that this
prediction of an increase in crime as a result of unrestricted use of sex-selection abor-
tion is purely statistical and is not based on any theory about male aggressiveness, the
influence of male hormones, or sociobiology. I claim .only that, because males statisti-
cally have been involved in violent crime far out of proportion to their numbers in the
population, an increase in their representation in the population would result in an in-
crease in violent crime. This empirically grounded prediction is therefore immune
from the attack one feminist has launched against predictions based on these other es-
oteric theories. See M. WARREN, supra note 20, at 108-29.
32. It is this author's opinion that, as the number of women relative to the number
of men declines, the demand for prostitutes would correspondingly increase. In turn,
one would expect that this demand would be satisfied.
33. Since the United States Constitution requires only a one person-one vote ratio,
as women diminish in numbers with respect to men, the relative voting strength of
men would increase. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires a one person-one vote ratio).
See generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.35-36, at 654-72.
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consequences would afflict society on a permanent or on a temporary
basis.
3. Possible Countervailing Tendencies.
There are, of course, various contingencies that could falsify these
predictions. One possibility is that a public awareness campaign
describing the adverse consequences for women might convince
couples not to utilize the technology. The success of such a campaign
would, however, depend on the truth of several suppositions. An ex-
amination of these assumptions reveals how difficult it would be to
wage a successful campaign.
For such a campaign to succeed, most couples would have to be
sympathetic with what is loosely called the "women's movement."
Couples not convinced that women need more "liberation" would be
unpersuaded. Moreover, such a campaign would fail with respect to
prospective mothers highly pressured by their husbands to preselect
a firstborn son, since success requires that women of their own ac-
cord would be responsive to such a public education program apart
from any pressure from spouses or lovers. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that women would respond positively to such a campaign,
but there is evidence that they would be unresponsive. One study of
college women, for example, found a two-to-one preference for first-
born sons even among women who moderately or strongly supported
the women's movement.34
So, there is good reason to doubt the effectiveness of a public edu-
cation campaign about the potential deleterious consequences of
preselecting sons. Of course, a public education campaign coupled
with criminal sanctions for sex-selection abortion would send a
stronger social message and would provide couples otherwise inclined
to select a firstborn son with real incentive to refrain.
There may yet materialize another possibility that would obviate
34. Gilroy & Steinbacher, supra note 29, at 674. Gilroy and Steinbacher suggest
that while college women supported the movement, they did not internalize the values
which the movement represented. Id. The authors offer this as an explanation for
these statistical results. Id. It should also be noted that there is an increasing trend
among males to indicate no preference for a firstborn of a particular sex. Id. at 675-76.
Another study of expectant parents found that 46% expressed no preference, and 63%
of the remainder preferred a boy. Pharis & Manosevitz, supra note 26, at 766. These
researchers hypothesize that, since it is less socially acceptable to express a preference
for a son, some couples may conceal their real preferences. Eighty-three percent of
mothers expressing no preference believed they were carrying a boy at the time of
their pregnancy. Id. at 767.
any need for public education or criminal sanctions. Even though
women express a willingness in the abstract to preselect sons, they
might take a different perspective if abortion were the only method
offered for gender preselection. In other words, it might be that wo-
men who would use abortion would not choose it for a trivial reason
such as gender selection, but would reserve it for eliminating un-
wanted children or fetuses with severe birth defects. However, the
empirical evidence for this proposition is ambiguous. When research-
ers posed the specific question, i.e., whether abortion was an accepta-
ble means of sex selection, between 4.2% and 40.3% of the
respondents answered affirmatively.35 This variance in attitudes was
largely due to religious beliefs and practices held by some interview-
ees-the less religious interviewees being more willing to use abor-
tion as a method of gender preselection.36
Though no studies have been conducted about factors actually in-
fluencing women in their decisions to abort, it is likely that the influ-
ence of husbands or lovers plays an important role. In the situation
where the pressure of husbands or lovers is overwhelming, it would
be unfair to punish women for yielding to their mates. The existence
of a statutory prohibition would at least provide women with a ra-
tionale for refusing to abort. Without a prohibition, women would be
left to overrule their mates for little else than purely personal rea-
sons. However, with a statutory prohibition, women could at least al-
lege the risk of criminal punishment as an overriding reason for
refraining from sex-selection abortion.37
B. The Rationales for Restricting Sex-Selection Abortions
Punishing women for seeking sex-selection abortions would seem
to raise another difficulty: such statutes seem to place more value on
fetal life than on a woman's privacy right. This view would seem to
conflict directly with Roe v. Wade.38 This potential problem will be
discussed in more detail later, but it should be made clear at the out-
set that the state would not be prohibiting sex-selection abortion be-
cause fetal life is sacrosanct. Instead, the state's goal would be to
35. Feil, Largey & Miller, Attitudes Toward Abortion as a Means of Sex Selection,
116 J. PSYCHOLOGY 269 (1984).
36. Id. at 271.
37. There is an additional way to make allowances for this possibility: any
criminalization of sex-selection abortion could be coupled with punishment imposed
upon the husband or lover who negligently or deliberately failed to object. Various de-
fenses might also be extended, such as a showing that objection would have been futile
or that the father could not have known about the decision. Such a statute would not
only discourage men from pressuring women to abort female fetuses, it would also en-
courage them to take steps to prevent an abortion when they otherwise might not.
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). I assume throughout this essay that, regardless of any
changes in the Supreme Court's composition, Roe v. Wade will not be overturned.
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ensure future equality of opportunity for future generations of wo-
men. Any fetuses whose lives are saved by such statutory prohibi-
tions are not thereby possessed of any serious "right to life." 39
A deontological40 justification based entirely on the intrinsic
wrongfulness of destroying a fetus in order to control the gender of
one's children would confer rights on the fetus incompatible with
Roe. A utilitarian justification similar to the one I have offered,
based solely on the morally objectionable consequences for the rest of
society, would not conflict with the holding in Roe. I will first briefly
show how a deontological approach is constitutionally defective. Then
I will discuss the consequentialist rationale in more detail.
1. The deontological rationales.
State legislatures could conceivably offer two deontological justifi-
cations for banning sex-selection abortions. They could advance, as
one state legislature has done,41 a "pro-life" approach, that fetuses
have as meaningful a right to life as post-natal human persons.
Under this view, the desire to control the sex of one's offspring is one
among many unjustifiable reasons for taking fetal life.
The second deontological rationale is that, although women are
free to take fetal life for almost any reason they choose, they may not
do so for a grossly sexist reason.42 Under this feminist view, sex-
39. See id.
40. A deontological theory of ethics holds that there are some acts human beings
have a moral duty to perform or refrain from performing regardless of the unhappi-
ness performing these duties may cause others. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
343 (1967). Warren dubs this approach "nonconsequentialist" and adds that sex-selec-
tion is an unnatural act which is tantamount to playing God. M. WARREN, supra note
20, at 78-83.
41. The General Assembly of Illinois prefaced its prohibition on sex-selection
abortions with a declaration of its policy that "the unborn child is a human being from
the time of conception ... and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the
laws and Constitution of this State." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-21 § 1 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1987); cf id. . 81-26 § 6(8) (text of statute prohibiting sex-selection abortion).
42. Powledge, Unnatural Selection: On Choosing Children's Sex, in ETHICAL IS-
SUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 428, 430 (1983). The philosophical basis for Powledge's po-
sition seems to be Thomson's 1971 article granting that aborting a pregnancy caused by
rape is permissible, but asserting that abortion for a trivial reason is "indecent." See
id. at 462. This view contrasts sharply with that of Tooley, who believes neither fe-
tuses nor newborns have any serious right to life, and any objections to the practices of
abortion and infanticide must rest on other grounds. Tooley, Abortion and Infanti-
cide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972).
Warren argues, however, that sex-selection abortion is not an inherently sexist act
because the individuals who engage in it may do so for motives that are not sexist. M.
WARREN, supra note 20, at 83-88. She notes that some women choose to have daugh-
ters because they are less violent than sons. Id. at 87. She further points out that the
selection abortion is one of many sexist practices that are inherently
wrong.
According to either of these positions, evidence about the harmful
effects of sex-selection abortion on American society is irrelevant, be-
cause it is intrinsically morally wrong to treat fetuses as having no
value unless they are of the desired gender. All acts of sex-selection
abortion would be punishable under this view, regardless of how
many or how few in number they are, just as other intrinsically
wrongful acts, such as murder and employment discrimination, are
punishable even if they are only isolated acts.
Both of the above justifications for sex-selection abortion will en-
counter serious constitutional difficulties, but the feminist view may
avoid one that the other does not. First, neither justification entails
any weighing of the competing interests, a requirement recognized in
the United States Supreme Court's analysis of equal protection chal-
lenges under the fourteenth amendment.43 The Court allows states
"son one might have had... cannot have been treated unjustly," since he never came
into existence. Id. Her argument, then, that sex-selection abortion is not inherently
sexist rests on at least two questionable assumptions: that the purity of the woman's
motive renders her act moral, and that the absence of a victim obviates the possibility
that the woman acted unjustly. However, even in Warren's example, the motives are
not entirely pure because women who abort male fetuses on the grounds that males
are more violent arguably perpetuate stereotypes about the violent tendencies of
males. Warren herself was careful to only go so far as to say males are more aggres-
sive than females, not that they are more violent. Id. at 110-13.
Warren's assumption that pure motives render one's actions morally right is also
questionable from a deontological standpoint because actions must first be shown to be
right in themselves before a deontologist can approve them. See 0. NELL, ACTING ON
PRINCIPLE: AN ESSAY ON KANTIAN ETHICS 32-34 (1975). Indeed, Kant's insistence that
one cannot tell a lie even to save a life may be interpreted as his strongest way of in-
sisting that good motives alone cannot render a morally bad action good. See KANT,
On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS 361-65 App. (T. Ab-
bott trans. 6th ed. 1959).
For similar deontological reasons, the fact that no one is injured by another's action
cannot render the action good if the action is wrong in itself. See 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 343 (1967). An example illustrating both of these points would be the case
of an employer who desired to hire an aggressive salesperson but refused to interview
women because he believed in good faith that women are too easily intimidated, not
that they are in any way inferior. We might imagine, additionally, that no women
choose to apply for the position. If it is inherently wrong and sexist to discriminate in
employment on the basis of sex, it does not seem that a good motive-or the absence of
a victim of discrimination---can render the employer's intent to refuse to interview wo-
men nonsexist or morally right. Yet, this example seems in all morally relevant re-
spects to correspond to Warren's allegedly nonsexist case of sex-selection abortion.
43. See generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.3, at 322-35. It should be noted,
however, that there are very few categories of state interests deemed "compelling." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-13 at 1465-66 (1988). See also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the state's interest in protecting the life of the
fetus becomes compelling at the beginning of the third trimester); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that national security was a sufficiently
"compelling" state interest to permit Japanese internment camps).
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to override fundamental rights only if the state can show that there
is a compelling interest for doing so, and that the classification in-
volved is the least restrictive means to effectuating that interest.44
The views outlined above affirmatively deny that a woman has a
legitimate right to abort her pregnancy in order to control the gender
of her offspring. As a result, her interest or desire to control the gen-
der of her child does not even weigh in the balance against the state's
interest in protecting fetal life.45 To hold that a woman's interest in
controlling the gender of her children automatically overrides any
state interest is totally foreign to the balancing test employed by the
Roe Court. 46
A second difficulty is that the pro-life view elevates the status of
the fetus beyond that which was pronounced by the Roe Court.47
The Court made it clear that a fetus enjoys no constitutional protec-
tion as a "person" under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 48 Although "pro-lifers" embrace the view that a fetus
has such protection at inception,49 feminist groups dispute this con-
tention.50 One must bear in mind that condemning sex-selection
abortion as sexist entails the view that the value of the fetus should
not hinge on its gender. If the act of destroying a fetus to conceive
44. 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.3, at 324-26. In Roe, the Court declared that
"[W]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, [it] has held that regulation limit-
ing these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' . . . and that legis-
lative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake." Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The Court went on to note that the state's
interest in protecting the life of the mother becomes "compelling" at the end of the
first three months of pregnancy (first trimester). Id. at 163. At the point of "viability,"
the state's interest in protecting the "potential life" becomes equally "compelling." Id.
Viability has been roughly defined as occurring at that point when the fetus is capable
of sustaining life outside the womb. Id.
45. These analogies are appropriate because all forms of abortion are tantamount
to murder in the eyes of most "pro-lifers." See, e.g., L. SUMNERS, ABORTION AND
MORAL THEORY 81-88 (1981). Sex-selection abortion, on the other hand, is "stupen-
dously sexist" for some feminists. Powledge, supra note 42, at 430. Under either view,
women seeking sex-selection abortions commit injustice for they seek to satisfy legiti-
mate aims, i.e., control over their futures, by means that are unjust. See J. RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 439 (1971).
46. See infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 42.
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-59. The text of the fourteenth amendment declares that
no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). In Roe, the court held that
"person" did not include an unborn fetus. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58. The Court went on,
however, to note that although the fetus itself has no protection under the Constitu-
tion, the state has a significant interest in the fetus' well being. Id. at 163.
49. See L. SUMNERS, supra note 45 at 81-88.
50. Id. at 40-49.
another fetus of the desired gender is in itself morally wrong, the
rights of the first fetus must have been violated. If so, it must have
some constitutionally protected right to continue to exist because it
would be immoral to kill it for trivial reasons. While the Court may
not have intended to preclude the possibility that the fetus has such a
right, the fact is that it simply did not address this issue.51 So, the
feminist view of the status of the fetus goes beyond the narrow hold-
ing in Roe.
These views clash with Roe in another way. The Court allowed
states to grant statutory protection to an unborn fetus in the third
trimester of pregnancy.52 Those who hold a deontological view could
not limit protection of the fetus this way, and still remain consistent
with their premise: If it is intrinsically wrong to sacrifice fetuses to
control the gender of one's children, then it is wrong to do so regard-
less of the gestational age of the fetus. For these reasons, it will be
difficult for a deontological rationale to command serious attention
from the Supreme Court, or at least from those members of the
Court unwilling to overturn Roe.
However, adherents to the feminist view could couch their argu-
ment in consequentialist terms and still remain consistent with their
premise. In addition to their primary argument that sex-selection
abortion is improper because it is sexist, it can be asserted that sex-
selection abortion is wrong, not because its effects on the fetus are
immoral, but because gender selection would have substantial harm-
ful consequences for American women. Such a justification, as I will
demonstrate after explicating the consequentialist argument, would
be attractive to those Justices satisfied with the holding in Roe v.
Wade.
2. The utilitarian rationale.
To better understand the consequentialist rationale for criminaliz-
ing sex-selection abortion, it is helpful to discard the notion that wo-
men and couples are wrongdoers who need to be punished. Instead,
their activities are in themselves innocent, but they result in the im-
position of unfair burdens on an unconsenting minority. In other
words, the state should restrict abortion only because sex-selection
abortion, if left unchecked, would have morally objectionable conse-
quences. Although there may be few if any other innocent practices
with morally comparable results, we can clarify matters by consider-
ing the appropriate social response to a recognized innocent activity
that becomes a social threat by its untoward consequences.
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. The Court stated that, "We need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins." Id.
52. Id. at 163-65.
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a. A hypothetical scenario in which private drunkenness could
be prohibited.
At present, private drunkenness that has ill effects only on the
(voluntary) participants is not subject to any criminal sanction, at
least until others who do not or cannot consent are placed at risk (as
when the drunkenness involves physical abuse of other family mem-
bers, child neglect, or driving an automobile). So long as the effects
are confined to the participants' health and work productivity, such
behavior presently goes unchecked by the law. If we consider what
at first blush seems to be the least costly effect, decreased worker
productivity, it appears that private drunkenness could become sig-
nificantly costly if it became widespread. Thus, if over half of the
population chose to become inebriated in private every night, the re-
sulting absenteeism and decreased work productivity, not to mention
increased health insurance premiums, would no longer seem insignif-
icant. The abstainers and moderate drinkers in the work force would
be called on to compensate for the decreased productivity of their co-
workers, and they, in turn, would be morally justified in seeking
some state intervention with respect to private drinking.
It might be thought that until American society reaches such a
condition, the government would have no moral right or social obli-
gation to restrict or forbid private drunkenness. Let us, however, al-
ter this hypothetical scenario so that there are no moderate drinkers
in society-only a majority of heavy drinkers, and a minority of ab-
stainers. Assume further, for purposes of illustration, that once the
opportunity for private drunkenness presents itself to the masses,
most choose not to resist the temptation. In this situation, the "iso-
lated decision" to become drunk in private would quickly lead to ad-
verse effects on worker productivity throughout society. It would no
longer be a merely private decision. Assuming society is entitled to
expect the usual level of job performance and the productivity that
results, the abstainers would be under no obligation to compensate
for the poor performance of their unrestrained coworkers. The ab-
stainers could, of course, elect to bear the loss, but they would be
under no obligation to bear the burdens occasioned by the existing
protection of the freedom to drink. In this hypothetical scenario, the
government would have a clear moral justification for raising the cost
of private drunkenness to the drinker.
b. Comparison of the sex-selection problem to the imaginary
drinking problem.
This hypothetical problem involving alcohol is similar to the sex-
selection abortion problem in three relevant respects: (1) both in-
volve private decisions that in isolated cases have little impact on so-
ciety; (2) if a large number of individuals came to the same private
decision, a minority of the population would be forced to bear these
significant social costs without receiving any compensating benefits;
and (3) most important, large numbers of people simply would not
resist the temptation to engage in these activities absent the imposi-
tion of some criminal sanction on the activity at issue. A brief discus-
sion of each of these conditions will emphasize how their combined
presence provides a justification for state interference with such
decisions.
The first condition is an example of what John Stuart Mill re-
ferred to in On Liberty as "self-regarding conduct."53 The individual
decision to seek an abortion for gender selection, like the individual
decision to become drunk, standing by itself has little, if any, impact
on society, so the state has no basis for interfering. Likewise, there is
no basis for state interference merely because the second condition is
satisfied, for it asserts simply that there would be a significant social
cost imposed on an unwilling minority if the majority decided to en-
gage in otherwise self-regarding behavior. When the third condition
is fulfilled, however, social costs are certain to be imposed on others,
and they, in turn, are entitled to some government intervention to re-
duce these costs.
In the case of sex-selection abortion, the costs would be borne by
future generations of women, even if sex-selection abortion does not
become a permanent, widespread sexist practice. That is, there
would be at least some generations in which men would greatly out-
number women, firstborn males would outnumber firstborn females,
and in which discrimination against women would be likely to greatly
increase. 54 It is possible that this would be the case in every genera-
tion, so the number of women who are the victims of crime and dis-
crimination might be higher or lower in number depending upon how
widespread the practice were to become. It is beyond question, how-
ever, that women would pay the cost for the preponderance of males
in terms of their disappointment, trauma, and lowered expectations.
Since women have no apparent compensating benefits in all this,
53. "[T]he only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." J.
MILL ON LIBERTY 9 (A. Castell ed. 1947).
54. See supra section II.A.1.
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they would be entitled to some relief-some effort on society's part
to reduce the number of female victims of crime and discrimination.
It should be noted that the relief called for here is similar to that
commonly found in state measures taken to minimize the occurrence
of free riders. That is, equality of opportunity between the sexes is
much like a public good which can be achieved only if couples, re-
strain their inclination to choose the gender of their children.
Couples who do not restrain themselves are not so much wrongdoers
as free riders. Punishment of those who fail to restrain themselves is
justified, not because choosing the gender of one's children is inher-
ently morally wrong, but because punishment effectively reduces the
incidence of free riders.
C Criminal Penalties
1. Possible legislative responses; terminology.
Still, it might be asked whether criminal punishment is an appro-
priate response to this type of free-rider problem. The governmental
response to free riders in the tax context, for example, is imposition
of fines to compensate for the additional expense the government in-
curs in tax collection, and to deter other potential tax delinquents.
In the sex-selection abortion setting, however, fines would not begin
to compensate for the opportunities women would lose, let alone the
suffering they would endure. Also, it would be difficult if not impos-
sible to determine which women suffered because of sex-selection
abortion and which would have suffered even if sex-selection abor-
tions never occurred. Furthermore, some couples who would partici-
pate in the practice would undoubtedly lack sufficient financial
resources to pay the fines imposed. This would make adequate com-
pensation of the affected women even more unlikely. Finally, very
wealthy couples would be able to absorb the fines associated with
several sex-selection abortions. Not only would this situation be un-
fair, it would further disadvantage women, since females would be
born into poor families in greater proportions than would men.
It might be said that, given that punishment is the appropriate soci-
etal response, perhaps it would be more effective to punish the be-
havior leading to sex-selection abortions rather than the act of having
the abortion itself. One suggestion would be to outlaw amniocentesis
altogether, but society, as well as pregnant women, would lose a great
deal by this exaggerated response. Impending complications in a
pregnancy, for example, could not be disclosed if amniocentesis were
banned, and it would be more difficult to assist women in giving birth
safely.55
A narrower suggestion would be to punish the practice of aborting
normal female fetuses after prenatal testing disclosed fetal gender
but indicated no fetal abnormalities. The mens rea element in such a
statute would be an awareness on the part of the couple of the test
results coupled with the subsequent intent to secure an abortion of
that fetus.5 6 Under this approach, the prosecution would not be re-
quired to present evidence that the couple sought the abortion be-
cause they knew the fetus was female but wanted a son.
A broader approach would be to outlaw all sex-selection abortions.
The mens rea element might be roughly defined as "having knowl-
edge of fetal gender and a desire not to have a child of that sex."
Both proposals might be dubbed "prohibition statutes." The one in-
volving the narrow approach of banning abortions of normal female
fetuses only, might be called the "sex-specific prohibition statute."
The broader approach of banning all sex-selection abortions could be
dubbed a "sex-neutral prohibition statute." Though not exhaustive
of the possibilities, these two proposals represent a moderate and an
extreme approach. The gender-specific statute is narrowly focused to
protect only female fetuses, but would nevertheless have maximim
deterrent effect by imposing a minimal burden of proof on the prose-
cution. On the other hand, the gender-neutral statute is broader in
scope since it protects normal fetuses of both sexes, but avoids con-
victions of those who have acted in good faith by placing a far heavier
burden of proof of mens rea on the prosecution.5 7 Both statutes
would exculpate women seeking to abort fetuses likely to be afflicted
with an x-linked genetic defect that could not be diagnosed in utero.
A more preventive approach would involve punishing physicians
for revealing fetal gender when it is not medically relevant.58 A stat-
ute of this sort might be labeled a "nondisclosure statute." Legisla-
55. Dickens, Prenatal Diagnosis and Female Abortion: A Case Study in Medical
Law and Ethics, 12 J. MED. ETHICS 143 (1986).
56. The reader will note that this proposal is closer to a strict liability statute. A
couple who knew the fetus's gender and did not desire a child of that sex might seek
an abortion because they decided to postpone childbearing. The couple would be in vi-
olation of the statute even though they did not seek an abortion to select the gender of
their children. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 81 (5th
ed. 1984) (discussing statutes imposing strict liability).
This statute is offered to allow the reader to compare different approaches. It is not
suggested that this narrow approach could not be modified to include a stricter mens
rea requirement. The approach offered, however, would save more female fetuses
than any other approach.
57. Attention will be focused primarily on the sex neutral statute, and the reader
should interpret my use of the term "prohibition statute" as a reference to the sex
neutral version, unless indicated otherwise.
58. For example, couples need not know fetal gender to calculate the odds of an x-
linked defect.
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tors might prefer to enact this statute alone, or they might deem it
more appropriate to maximize deterrence by enacting both a nondis-
closure statute and a prohibition statute. Both possibilities will be
considered.
Perhaps the most desirable approach would be for the medical pro-
fession to preempt state legislatures by subjecting physicians to pro-
fessional discipline for performing gender-selection abortions. Once
it had been determined that the physician performed this procedure
with the knowledge or reason to believe the abortion was being
sought for gender-selection purposes only, or for disclosing fetal gen-
der when it was not relevant to medical care, disciplinary measures
could be taken.59
This proposal is a better alternative for several reasons. First, pro-
fessional medical groups would be better able to keep abreast of rele-
vant technological developments than would legislators. Second,
professional medical groups would be better informed about possible
ways couples might subvert the system, such as by falsely represent-
ing a history of x-linked diseases in the family. Finally, litigation
concerning the constitutionality of restrictions on sex-selection abor-
tion might be avoided because state action may be absent.60
However, physicians might not be able to agree on the restrictions,
if any, that should be imposed on the uses of abortion and prenatal
testing. Or, it might turn out that the courts would deem impositions
of professional discipline to be state action for constitutional pur-
poses.61 In either event, even professional disciplinary procedures
may be subjected to the same constitutional challenges discussed in
this Article.
Regardless of what legislative option the states choose, there will
59. Dickens, supra note 55, at 143-44. Still another possibility would be to prohibit
only that part of the amniocentesis procedure that involves the determination of fetal
gender. There is no indication in the medical literature that this would be possible,
given present techniques. Evidently, a physician can determine the sex of the fetus
upon examination of the chromosomes for abnormalities. Telephone interview with
Marsha Ryan, M.D., J.D. (Aug. 28, 1987). For the advantages that this prohibition en-
joys, even when enacted by state legislatures, see irnfra note 68 and accompanying text.
60. All amendments to the Constitution protecting individual liberties, except the
thirteenth, address themselves to actions taken by a state or the United States. See
generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 16.1, at 156-58. The individual challenging the
constitutionality of a particular action by another must typically show that the act
which caused the injury was performed or ratified by a governmental entity. Id.
61. This conclusion could be based on the fact that medical professionals are li-
censed by the state, that medical groups are encouraged by the state to impose disci-
pline, or that the groups perform a public function. See id. at 156-83 (discussing state
action doctrine).
be some precautions legislators could take to avoid certain controver-
sies. Before considering the constitutional problems inherent in such
statutes, ways in which state legislatures can anticipate difficulties
will be discussed.
2. Some legislative precautions.
A sex-neutral prohibition statute would specify as an element of
the crime the specific intent of seeking an abortion on the basis of
the fetus' gender. In close cases, the courts would be required to de-
termine the guilt of a woman who preferred a male firstborn, knew
her baby was female, but nevertheless acted in good faith. For ex-
ample, a woman's overriding reason for seeking an abortion might be
financial considerations or fear of a serious defect. Such determina-
tions would not be easy to make, but it must be remembered that
finders of fact regularly make determinations about good faith states
of mind in various sorts of cases. In a sales transaction, for example,
a holder in due course can recover what the purchaser owes the
seller (even though the seller breached), provided, inter alia, the
holder is shown to have acquired the note from the seller in good
faith.62 Similarly, in some jurisdictions, an accused rapist may raise
the defense that he mistakenly believed the victim consented.63 In
such cases, the trier of fact decides whether there was in fact a rea-
sonable mistake.
The burden of making these critical determinations in sex-selec-
tion abortion cases would be eased somewhat by the likelihood that
in such questionable cases the fetus might also have a serious disor-
der, since the sex-neutral prohibition statute would exclude from lia-
bility women seeking to abort defective fetuses anyway. Women
preferring a firstborn male are more likely to have discovered the
gender of their fetus through amniocentesis and they would most
likely have undergone the procedure to determine whether the fetus
was defective. 64
Legislators should specify which defects are sufficiently serious to
62. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(b) (discussing good faith of holders in due course).
63. The English House of Lords, in a far-reaching decision, held that an accused is
innocent of rape if he believed the victim consented, even though a reasonable person
in the place of the defendant would have realized the victim did not consent. Regina v.
Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182. The Model Penal Code defines rape in part as compelling a
woman "to submit [to sexual intercourse] by force or by threat of imminent death, se-
rious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping .... .. " MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1(1)(a) (1974). By contrast, the Code provides that a male commits gross sexual
imposition if he compels a woman "to submit by any threat that would prevent resist-
ance by a woman of ordinary resolution .... " Id. § 213.1(2)(a).
64. See T. KELLY, CLINICAL GENETICS AND GENETIC COUNSELING 368-69 (2d ed.
1986); see also J. THOMPSON & M. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 344 (listing conditions
indicative of fetal disorder and for which amniocentesis is appropriate).
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merit a legal abortion. This would do much to relieve the courts of
the burden of deciding such matters on a case-by-case basis. The list
could not, of course, be all-inclusive. To avoid unfairness, legislators
would certainly want to allow for disclosure of the fetal gender when
the fetus might be a carrier of an x-linked defect not diagnosable
prenatally.65
In cases where a sex-neutral statute was enacted, the legislature
could deal with this problem in another way. It could specifically al-
low the finder of fact to infer an impermissible motive whenever the
facts are ambiguous. To avoid due process difficulties, the judge
would have to instruct the jury clearly that it was not required to
draw this inference. 66 The prospect that juries could draw this infer-
ence would encourage women preferring firstborn males to give birth
to female babies rather than risk conviction under the prohibition
statute. This in turn would increase the number of female children
and make imbalances in future generations less likely. There is, of
course, some risk that a few women will be found guilty even though
they acted with proper motives, but this number is likely to be ex-
tremely small.
Another legislative precaution would be to include a preamble to
any prohibition statute precisely stating the legislative purpose. The
equal protection advantages of this, along with a proposal as to the
specific content of such a preamble, will be subsequently discussed.67
For now, it will be sufficient to note that prohibition statutes will
present various procedural and constitutional difficulties. It is tempt-
ing, therefore, to conclude that it would be far simpler and less con-
troversial to enact only a nondisclosure statute. But nondisclosure
statutes raise serious constitutional questions as well. We now turn
our attention to those issues.
65. Carriers of x-linked defects are invariably female. J. THOMPSON & M. THOMP-
SON, supra note 10, at 74-76. Thus, a couple concerned that the fetus might be a carrier
of a disease that could not be diagnosed prenatally would need to know the gender of
the fetus to estimate the probability that the fetus was a carrier. See T. KELLY, supra
note 64, at 67-69; see also J. THOMPSON & M. THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 340-43. To
deny parents knowledge of the gender of the fetus in cases where the couple is con-
cerned about the carrier status of the fetus, but grant access to such information when
the couple is concerned about the fetus expressing the disorder, would be unfair. In
both cases the couples are concerned about transmitting genetic defects, though admit-
tedly the transmission is more remote in the case of a carrier child.
66. The state cannot shift its burden of proof in a criminal case by presenting a
mandatory presumption to the jury. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979)
(holding that defendant's due process rights deprived if judge instructs jury that bur-
den of proving any element of crime has shifted to defendant to disprove).
67. See infra text following note 163.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES WITH A STATUTE PROHIBITING
PHYSICIANS FROM DISCLOSING THE SEX OF THE FETUS
Any statute imposing a duty on physicians to conceal the gender of
a fetus from a pregnant patient, or forbidding a physician from per-
forming tests to determine fetal gender would seem not only to im-
pinge on the woman's privacy right and her first amendment right to
acquire information, but would also affect the physician's right to
free speech. However, the impact on the woman's privacy right
would not be as serious as it might first appear because she would
still be able to obtain medically relevant information. The nondisclo-
sure statute at issue would also allow the physician to reveal the gen-
der of the fetus when prenatal diagnosis would be unable to detect
whether the fetus is afflicted with, or is a carrier of, an x-linked de-
fect.68 A woman's right to benefit from her physician's judgment was
mentioned in Roe v. Wade69 by way of dicta, but this was limited to
professional medical judgment.
A. A Woman's Constitutional Right to Her Physician's Advice
Does Not Extend to Identification of Fetal Gender
In Roe, Justice Blackmun suggested that a woman's privacy right
includes a right to benefit from her physician's medical judgment
about abortion.70 He stated that, during the first trimester, "the
abortion decision . . . must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician." 71 He also stated that "the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to deter-
mine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment,
the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."72 Assuming argu-
endo that these statements in Roe were intended to constitutionalize
a woman's right to receive her physician's medical opinion, there is
no suggestion that a woman has a right to receive information apart
from that which is embodied in a medical opinion. Thus, under Roe,
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The reader should also note at this
point that a state could preclude any objection that the statute interferes with privacy
or free speech rights by banning the performance of that part of the amniocentesis
procedure which reveals fetal gender when no x-linked disease is in question. Such a
ban would affect the physician's actions, not the communication of the test results.
Nevertheless, a state may want to enact a nondisclosure statute in addition to this ban
in the event that fetal gender is obvious by inference or is inadvertently revealed.
Note also that there are practical difficulties in separating the determination of fetal
sex and the search for abnormalities. See supra note 59.
69. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The Court noted that during the time prior to the
"compelling" point where the state has a legitimate interest in the woman's choice to
have an abortion, she has the right to consult with a physician in order to determine
whether this action should be taken.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 164.
72. Id. at 163.
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a woman has a right only to receive her physician's medical judgment
based on the facts of the case and generalizations based on medical
experience and research. Indeed, normative judgments of any sort,
whether medical or nonmedical, are a blend of fact and values, never
facts alone.73 Hence, a woman's constitutional right to privacy, even
if it includes a right to benefit from a physician's judgment, cannot
include a right to receive information alone. A fortiori, the privacy
right cannot include information identifying fetal gender.
It might nevertheless be contended that the state may not restrict
the flow of information from the physician to the woman. Indeed, in
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,74 Justice Powell in-
validated an informed consent statute in part because it intruded
"upon the discretion of the pregnant woman's physician."75 Taken
out of context, Justice Powell's remarks suggest that a physician
should be free from all state interference in deciding what informa-
tion the patient should receive. But the ordinance in Akron imposed
a duty to convey information to the patient before an abortion could
be performed.76 By imposing a duty to act on the part of a physician
as a prerequisite to administering an abortion, the Akron ordinance
went far beyond a nondisclosure statute. A physician acting pursuant
to such a statute is not required to convey any information, and the
duty the statute does impose is not a prerequisite to a woman's ob-
taining an abortion in any case.
Of course, it might be argued that the nondisclosure statute could
interfere with a physician's exercise of his or her discretion to an ex-
tent equal to the informed consent ordinance, since a physician's dis-
cretion might in some cases dictate that information about fetal
gender be conveyed to patients. The nondisclosure statute, however,
does not impose a blanket duty to withhold the information. Physi-
cians can reveal fetal gender when x-linked defects are at stake.
Therefore, the nondisclosure statute is not nearly as sweeping as the
Akron informed consent statute. Moreover, the nondisclosure statute
is also less intrusive, insofar as the physician's performance of this
duty is unrelated to the woman's general right to seek an abortion.
In those jurisdictions that allow sex-selection abortion, the patient
73. Normative judgments are, inter alia, recommendations about the goodness or
absence thereof in some course of action. See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 177-78
(1967); rf 1 id. at 54 (discussing the mixture of fact and value in aesthetic judgments).
74. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
75. Id. at 445.
76. Id. at 442.
would be free to obtain an abortion whether her physician has com-
plied with the nondisclosure statute or not.
In those jurisdictions in which a nondisclosure statute is combined
with a prohibition statute, however, the similarity to the Akron in-
formed consent requirement is much closer, because there would be
a nexus between a woman's access to an abortion and the physician's
duty not to disclose. However, the connection is still not as tight as
that existing in Akron, where the physician's performance of duties
was a precondition for access to an abortion.
To be sure, under such a statutory configuration, a woman could
not abort her fetus based solely on its gender, but whether the physi-
cian has told her the fetus's gender or she has learned it from an-
other source, her right to an abortion would not automatically be
precluded. In Akron, however, her right to an abortion could not be
exercised unless her physician gave her the information.
In short, there is some suggestion in dicta in Roe and Akron that a
woman's privacy right entitles her to the benefit of her physician's
medical judgment.77 However, even if the privacy right were ex-
tended that far, it is not at all clear that it would encompass factual
information apart from that which is embedded in a physician's medi-
cal judgment.
B. A Nondisclosure Statute Does Not C7early Violate A Physician's
or Patient's Right of Free Speech
A more promising constitutional argument against a nondisclosure
statute is one based on the free speech right of the physician to in-
form the patient and the woman's free speech right to receive infor-
mation.78 It might be argued that the force of any free speech
objection could be circumvented by imposing the restrictions on the
test for fetal gender identification itself, rather than forbidding com-
munication of the results of the test, on the grounds that banning the
test is forbidding an action, while restricting the communication of
the test results is a restriction on speech. However, it would be im-
prudent for a legislature to ban the use of such tests for all purposes.
Rather than imposing a blanket ban, the legislation would most
likely specify that the test may not be performed for the sole purpose
of disclosing the sex of the fetus. It would then be clear, however,
that the purpose of the statute was to restrict the flow of information
between the physician and the patient, since it would not have to do
with the time, place, or manner of the communication, but rather the
content of the speech itself. Such a restriction would be tantamount
to an outright ban on the conveying of information and would there-
77. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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fore be likely to encounter free speech difficulties anyway. 79
A nondisclosure statute aimed at restricting the actual content of
the speech clearly does not fall into any of the recognized exceptions
to the regulation of protected speech, namely obscenityO and fighting
words;S1 nor does it seem to create a clear and present danger of im-
minent lawless action.8 2 Such a statute might pass first amendment
muster, however, if construed as a regulation of a form of "private"
speech not subject to significant first amendment protection,8 3 or as a
form of commercial speech that the states can regulate more freely
than noncommercial speech. Each of these possibilities will be con-
sidered in turn.
1. Communication of the identity of the gender of an unborn
fetus is a form of private speech.
The Supreme Court has carved out an exception to the require-
ment of serious first amendment protections for certain types of
speech that are private in nature. A salient characteristic of such un-
protected speech is that it touches "upon matters of public concern in
only a most limited sense .... ,,84 In Connick v. Myers, the speech for
which a public employee was ultimately fired was "most accurately
characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office
policy."85 Even though the Court refused to lay down specific rules
for all employer-employee disputes, it did emphasize that "the First
Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of speech upon is-
79. See generally 3 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 20.47 at 235-38.
80. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (discusssing standard for obscenity
exception to free speech right).
81. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see also Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction of a speaker when
his arrest was to protect him from a hostile audience). But see Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning conviction for breach of peace for wearing jacket displaying
"Fuck the Draft" in courthouse).
82. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam). The defendant, a college
demonstrator, was arrested under Indiana's disorderly conduct statute for yelling an
obscenity in protest of police intervention regarding the demonstration. The Supreme
Court held that this form of speech was not legally obscene nor could it be construed
as "fighting words." Id. at 107-08. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(per curiam) (discussing clear and present danger rule).
83. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (employer's discharge of public em-
ployee for refusing to accept transfer and distributing questionnaire among other pub-
lic employees complaining about working environment held not in violation of
employee's free speech rights).
84. Id. at 154.
85. Id.
sues of public concern ."86
In an earlier case, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,8 7 the Court had granted first amendment protection to a
public employee's objection about the school district's allegedly ra-
cially discriminatory policies to her employer made in a private,
rather than public, setting. The reason articulated for protecting the
speech was that it raised issues of public concern. First amendment
freedom is not "lost to the public employee who arranges to commu-
nicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views
before the public."88
In Connick, the Court denied that it was suggesting that speech
about private matters, like obscenity, was entitled to no protection.8 9
The Court simply announced that a "federal court is not the appro-
priate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's be-
havior."90 The Court made it clear that private speech about public
figures would still be entitled to first amendment protection in a libel
action.91
Of course, the nondisclosure statute does not prevent the physician
from communicating anything of public concern to the patient. Nev-
ertheless, it could be argued that when a physician reveals informa-
tion about a patient's fetus, an impact on the public will result (at
least in a collective sense) if enough doctors were to communicate
such information to enough patients. This impact would be the result
of female patients' action or inaction, as the result of being informed
of the gender of their fetuses.
At issue in the nondisclosure statute, however, is the prohibition
on communication-not upon hypothetically possible subsequent ac-
tion. Moreover, as in all free speech cases, the issue is the nature of
the individual communication, not the collective question of what
would happen if large numbers of people shared the same
communication. 92
There is no question but that the communication at issue here is
purely private. Certainly, no patient could plausibly claim that the
information the doctor provides her is anything but a purely private
86. Id.
87. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
88. Id. at 415-16.
89. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id.
92. For example, "fighting words" and "hostile audience" cases focus upon the ac-
tions likely to be taken by listeners upon hearing the words. See supra note 81. No
Supreme Court holding about the right to freedom of speech has ever hinged on the
answer to the hypothetical question of what actions would have followed if large num-
bers of people had heard the words at issue.
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matter between her and her doctor. The desire of a woman to know
the gender of her fetus does not imply a concomitant desire to discuss
her abortion decision in a public forum. As any woman would con-
firm, such decisions are not, individually, any matter of public
concern.
Still, it might be thought that the Court left the door open to first
amendment protection of a doctor's identification of the gender of
the fetus with its suggestion that "private" speech is worth something
more than obscene remarks or fighting words.93 However, the
Court's opinion was intended to address libel actions to obtain com-
pensation for damage to the reputation of a party that was the sub-
ject of the communication. 94 Here, the fetus is the subject of the
communication, and even if it were subsequently born alive, that per-
son could not conceivably suffer compensable injuries as a result of
the physician-patient dialogue.
Moreover, in a subsequent "private" speech case, Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,95 the Supreme Court afforded
little protection to such communications by allowing a corporate
plaintiff to recover presumed and punitive damages from a credit re-
porting agency that falsely and negligently reported to five of its sub-
scribers that the plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy. Justice Powell's
plurality opinion stressed the private nature of the communication 96
and the lower value placed by the first amendment on private
speech.97 If the door to first amendment protection of identification
of fetal gender was open in Connick, the door would seem to have
effectively been closed in Greenmoss Builders. Connick merely al-
lowed for the possibility that "private" speech could be insulated to
some extent from libel actions, 98 but Greenmoss Builders showed
that, absent an issue of public concern, insulation from damages for
libel is not available.99 Because the first amendment does not protect
private communications from damage suits in libel, it would seem
that a physician's disclosure of the gender of the fetus to the preg-
nant patient is without serious first amendment consequences.
However, these appeals to Greenmoss Builders and Connick are
93. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
94. Id.
95. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
96. Id. at 761-63.
97. Id. at 758-61.
98. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
99. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 755-59.
misleading in two crucial respects. First, the contexts are different.
Whereas Greenmoss Builders and Connick dealt with commercial
transactions and employer-employee relations, respectively, a nondis-
closure statute would restrict communications within the private and
personal relation between physician and patient. Second, the sanc-
tions at issue in Connick and Greenmoss Builders were non-criminal.
Had the Court been presented with a doctor's imprisonment for re-
vealing information about a patient's fetus-regardless of whether
the revelation was trivial, such as eye color, or of serious significance,
such as the prospects of stillbirth-the result would most likely have
been different.100
There are no judicial decisions supporting this prediction, because
no state has seen fit to restrict fetal information to the mother. In-
deed, there are many private relationships, such as husband and wife
and priest and penitent, involving private communications, the first
amendment protection of which will remain uncertain until a state
dares to restrict these communications. The absence of case law to
support this assertion does not serve to falsify it. Likewise, the ab-
sence of relevant case law should not warrant rejecting the predic-
tion that the Court would find criminal punishment of a doctor for
revealing fetal gender to his patient to be a violation of the first
amendment. At the very least, these reflections show that the "pri-
vate" speech cases are not a reliable basis for asserting that the Court
would not afford any serious first amendment protection to disclo-
sures of fetal gender.
The uncertainty of the degree of first amendment protection the
Court would afford doctor-patient communications is further under-
scored by the strong interest of the state in restricting such commu-
nications. In Connick and Greenmoss Builders, the state had no
reason to protect the communications. Conversely, it had no reason
to restrict them because publication of false credit reports and con-
tinued employee disputes present no threat to future generations.
On the other hand, routine disclosure of fetal gender does present
such a threat. Therefore, the degree of first amendment protection
the Court would afford disclosure of fetal gender is especially
unclear.
100. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a doctor was convicted of dis-
tributing advice and information concerning contraception to married couples. The
Court struck down the statute, in what has become a significant case involving the con-
stitutional right to privacy. The Court noted that the doctor was subject to a criminal
fine and possible imprisonment. Id. at 480.
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2. A state may restrict a doctor's communication even if it
constitutes commercial speech.
A prohibition statute might escape exacting constitutional scrutiny
if doctors' communications are a form of commercial speech.1o1 As
one student note points out, there is a basis in the commercial speech
doctrine for the state's calling "into question the 'legitimacy' of the
information sought by a woman who desires a sex-selection abortion
.... "102 Although the reasons given for this conclusion may not be
as persuasive as they could be, the conclusion is basically correct in
that, if a doctor's communication were commercial speech, it could
nevertheless be restricted. 03 However, as will be shown in this sec-
tion, the author of that case note incorrectly assumed that doctors'
communications are commercial speech. First, it will be shown that
this is not commercial speech in any recognizable sense, and then the
reasons why such speech may be restricted even if it were commer-
cial speech will be discussed.
a. A doctor's communication is not commercial speech.
The student note mentioned above contains no support for the
proposition that a doctor's informing the patient of the gender of her
fetus is commercial speech. The author seems to assume that, be-
cause the communication occurs in fulfillment of a commercial agree-
ment, it is commercial speech.10 4 However, the Supreme Court's
definition of commercial speech is restricted to speech that precedes,
and is designed to induce, such transactions. Justice Blackmun's ma-
jority opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Councillo5 made this clear. Interestingly, the
challenge to the Virginia statute prohibiting advertising of prescrip-
tion drug prices in that case' 0 6 was brought, not by a "speaker," but
by members of the "audience"-two consumer groups and a Virginia
101. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
102. Note, Sex Selection Abortion: A Constitutional Analysis of the Abortion Lib-
erty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281, 318 (1981).
103. See 3 ROTUNDA supra note 12, §§ 16.26-.31, at 904-24. But see Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding unconstitutional statute which outlawed any adver-
tisements which promoted abortion).
104. See Note, supra note 102 at 313.
105. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
106. Id. at 744-50. The statute provided that any licensed pharmacist in Virginia
who published the price for or promoted any prescription drug would be guilty of un-
professional conduct. Id. If convicted under this statute, a pharmacist could lose his
license. Id. at 752.
resident in need of prescription drugs.107 After observing that the is-
sue of commercial speech was squarely before the Court, Justice
Blackmun pointed out that neither editorializing, nor reporting of
newsworthy facts was at issue.10 8 He then implied that purely com-
mercial speech does no more than propose a commercial transaction:
"The 'idea' [the pharmacist] wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I
will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.'"109 If purely
commercial speech is that which proposes a commercial transaction
and raises no issue of public concern, speech that occurs as part of
the transaction that follows the proposal could not be characterized
as commercial speech. Thus, it is incorrect to characterize a doctor's
communication of test results as commercial speech.
b. If a doctor's communications were commercial speech, states
which ban sex-selection abortion may ban associated
communications.
Assuming arguendo that a doctor's conveying such information was
commercial speech, there are several grounds for the validity of a
nondisclosure statute. The aforementioned student author concluded
that a state's interest in prohibiting the communication of such infor-
mation outweighed that of a physician because the widespread use of
amniocentesis might threaten maternal health, and because the state
is entitled to maintain a balanced gender ratio and to discourage sex-
ism in society.110 However, the author incorrectly assumed that the
state's interests could be weighed in the balance before determining
whether the physician's disclosure overcomes the first hurdle the
Court placed before commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.111 In that case, Justice
Powell required that commercial speech "at least must concern law-
ful activity and not be misleading" before it can be protected by the
first amendment.112 Only when this has first been determined may
the court ask whether the regulation is "not more extensive than is
necessary" to achieve a "substantial" governmental interest. 13 Thus,
in those states in which sex-selection abortion is illegal, the nondis-
closure statute would prohibit speech concerning an unlawful activ-
107. Id. at 753.
108. Id. at 760-61. The court distinguished several previous cases which involved
more than just commercial speech. Id. at 759-61.
109. Id.
110. Note, supra note 102, at 317.
111. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (New York Public Service Commission's order to cease all
advertising promoting "use of electricity" held in violation of first and fourteenth
amendment free speech rights).
112. Id. at 566.
113. Id.
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ity.1 14  In these jurisdictions, therefore, the question of the
extensiveness of the regulation would not be reached. The speech
would be unprotected. However, if the validity of a nondisclosure
statute were at issue in a state that permitted sex-selection abortion,
the governmental interests in protecting maternal health, discourag-
ing sexism, and maintaining a balanced gender ratio would weigh
heavily in the balance as the student note suggested.115
Prenatal testing, however, may become safer and less costly in the
future, so concerns about maternal health and safety may prove to be
insignificant.116 Moreover, prenatal test results may become widely
available early enough in the first trimester' 17 so that second-trimes-
ter abortions could be avoided. The crucial question, then, would be
whether discouraging gender discrimination and maintaining a bal-
anced gender ratio are sufficiently substantial governmental
interests.
i. The governmental interests are sufficiently substantial.
There is ample precedent for the state's preventing individuals
from receiving information that they might use to discriminate on
the basis of gender or race. Inquiries about a job applicant's sex, for
example, are prohibited by EEOC guidelines, unless based on a bona
fide occupational qualification.118 The Court has upheld an ordinance
prohibiting newspapers from running separate classified advertise-
ments for men and women job applicants.119 HUD guidelines on fair
housing not only prohibit overtly discriminatory advertising for hous-
ing, but also prohibit selective use of media in advertising so as to fo-
114. See 3 ROTUNDA supra note 12, § 16.31, at 909. See also Pittsburg Press Co. v.
Pittsburg Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that publication of
illegal material is not protected speech).
115. See supra text accompanying note 110.
116. Fetal death and other serious complications for mothers or fetuses occur in ex-
perienced centers in less than 0.5% of cases. Dickens, Abortion, Amniocentesis and the
Law, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 250 (1986). The procedure is still costly. Id. at 252-53.
117. Chorionic villi sampling is a diagnostic test that can detect some but not all of
the disorders identifiable by amniocentesis and is available in the eighth to tenth week
of pregnancy. Id. at 251. See also T. KELLY, supra note 64, at 369-72. Results are avail-
able in one or two days. Dickens, supra note 116, at 252-53. By contrast, amniocentesis
can be performed in the sixteenth week, but results are not available for another six
weeks. Id. at 249. There is also a variation on traditional amniocentesis that yields re-
liable results earlier in many cases. Findley, Potter & Findley, Alternative Strategies
of Fetal Sex Diagnoses and Sex Preselection, 31 Soc. BIOLOGY 120, 137 (1984).
118. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (1987).
119. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
cus appeals for housing on members of a particular race.1 20 Also, the
District of Columbia Circuit went beyond Shelley v. Kraemer,12 1 and
held that the mere recording of discriminatory restrictive covenants
in real estate deeds, "even if no effort is made to enforce them," vio-
lated Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.122 Thus, even speech
that involves no advertising may be regulated by federal statutes
prohibiting discriminatory notices or statements.
It may be argued that fair housing and equal employment guide-
lines are distinguishable from the nondisclosure statute since the
communications at issue in those cases were discriminatory on their
face. Moreover, the recipients of the information in those cases, the
employees and landlords, had no legitimate need to know the race of
their employees or tenants. Here, however, a woman may have a le-
gitimate need to discover information about her future child's gender.
For instance, such information would be useful in planning what
clothes or toys to buy, or how to decorate the baby's bedroom. Fur-
thermore, the information involved here is entirely factual; it simply
identifies the fetus more precisely.
In response, one may point to entirely legal adoption laws that pre-
vent people from discovering information about their blood relatives,
despite strong desires, or even legitimate needs to acquire it.123 The
justification for such laws is, in part, that the interest of the natural
mothers in remaining anonymous to their children once they put
their children up for adoption is of far greater social importance than
the right of adopted children to know the identity of their natural
mothers. 12 4 Courts have upheld the constitutionality of such laws by
weighing the competing interests in this fashion.' 25 Similarly, a preg-
nant woman's need to know the gender of her child, when no genetic
defects are at issue, pales in comparison with the state's need to pre-
vent future oppression of women and maintain a balanced ratio of
120. R. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 176 (1983) (discussing guidelines
for implementing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)).
121. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating enforcement of racially restrictive covenants on
equal protection grounds).
122. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 631 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (per curiam).
123. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 227(a) (West 1988) (prohibiting disclosure of information
concerning adopted child unless by order of the court). See also Terzian v. Superior
Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 286, 88 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1970) (holding that confidentiality of
adoption proceeding should be maintained absent showing of good cause).
124. E.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234-36 (2d Cir. 1979) (laws bar-
ring adult adoptees from access to records upheld against substantive due process and
equal protection attacks); In re Janice Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1390 (1986) (rejecting
adult adoptee's claim of fundamental right to learn identity of biological parents); see
also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1984) (en
banc) (right of action recognized in biological mother for breach of confidential rela-
tionship against physician who revealed her identity to daughter given up for adoption
shortly after birth).
125. See cases cited supra note 124.
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the sexes in the population. Thus, the existence of a legitimate need
to know is not enough; instead, the crucial question is how heavily
that need to know weighs in comparison with the legitimate interests
advanced by the action of the state.
ii. The nondisclosure statute would not be
unnecessarily extensive.
Assuming that the dual goals of discouraging sexism and maintain-
ing a balanced gender ratio are sufficiently substantial, there is little
doubt that a court would view the nondisclosure statute as properly
tailored to achieve these goals. If the statute made no exception for
women who could not otherwise predict the presence of an x-linked
disease in the fetus, the statute would most certainly be deemed over-
inclusive. But, properly circumscribed, the statute would keep in ig-
norance only those women lacking a legitimate medical need to know
the sex of their fetuses. 126 The statute would, therefore, be only
broad enough to have an impact on only those women with at most a
trivial reason to know.
C. Summary
A nondisclosure statute would not interfere with a woman's right
to privacy so long as the statute allowed her to benefit from her phy-
sician's medical judgment. The statute could provide for this by mak-
ing exceptions for women whose fetuses could not be diagnosed as
having an x-linked disease. Although it is unclear whether the
courts would view the statute as a regulation of unprotected private
speech, the above-mentioned exception clause would ensure that the
statute would not unduly violate any free speech right, should the
courts deem the physician's communication of fetal gender to the wo-
man to be commercial speech. Such a clause would ensure that the
statute was no more over-inclusive than needed to accomplish its
goals of discouraging sexism and preserving a balanced gender ratio
in the population. Before a court reaches the question of unnecessary
126. Cases will undoubtedly arise in which there will be a legitimate nonmedical
need to know fetal sex. One such case might involve an older woman with several
daughters who would continue the pregnancy only if she knew the fetus were male.
See T. KELLY, supra note 64, at 389. The mother would predictably abort the fetus if
the physician refuses to test for fetal sex. The physician in such a situation would
have an opportunity to save a male fetus. From the legislator's point of view, however,
making exceptions for cases like this would swallow the rule. Those parents who find
themselves unable psychologically to relate to children of a certain sex would similarly
seem to have a legitimate need to know.
overinclusiveness, however, it is likely to conclude that the doctor's
communication is not commercial speech, because the communication
involved here is not an invitation to a commercial transaction.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES WITH PROHIBITIONS ON
SEX-SELECTION ABORTIONS
Legislators may want to couple a nondisclosure statute with a pro-
hibition statute for a number of reasons. The nondisclosure statute
alone may not be effective since couples may discover the gender of
the fetus by inadvertence or by design (e.g. falsely reporting to the
physician a family history of an x-linked disease not diagnosable in
utero). Also, a prohibition statute would strengthen the case for the
constitutionality of any nondisclosure statute, since the prohibition
statute would declare illegal the activity with which the doctor's com-
munication (banned by' the nondisclosure statute) is concerned.
Thus, the nondisclosure statute would restrict speech about unlawful
activity and would satisfy the Central Hudson Gas test.127
Nevertheless, the prohibition statute itself would face serious con-
stitutional objections. This Article will next explore the statute's ef-
fects on women's privacy rights and the possibility of generating an
equal protection claim. Unless indicated otherwise, the difficulties
discussed will be those associated with an existing sex-neutral prohi-
bition statute that outlaws sex-selection abortions of any fetus, male
or female.128
A. A Prohibition Statute does Not Violate a Woman's
Privacy Rights
The constitutional basis for a woman's right to obtain an abortion
during early pregnancy is familiar enough. The Court reasoned in
Roe v. Wade129 that a state's interests in preserving fetal life and
protecting maternal health were not sufficiently compelling to justify
a ban on abortion in the first and second trimesters. 130 The Court
conceded, however, that a state could regulate abortion in the second
trimester to protect maternal health.131 It is tempting to conclude
that Roe precludes a governmental ban on sex-selection abortion dur-
ing the first or second trimester. But this conclusion would be un-
warranted because the factual situation in Roe is radically different
from the situation presented by sex-selection abortion cases.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 111-15.
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 81-26 § 6(8) (Smith-Hurd 1987). See supra text
preceeding note 59 for comparison of an example of a sex-neutral prohibition statute
with an example of a sex-specific prohibition statute.
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
130. Id. at 164.
131. Id.
[Vol. 15: 295, 1988] Sex-Selection Abortion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
To appreciate the significance of the different factual settings, we
must bear in mind that the Roe Court engaged in a balancing of com-
peting interests prior to concluding that a woman is entitled to obtain
an abortion in the early stage of pregnancy.132 When the interests in
the balance are different, however, one would expect the Court to
reach a different conclusion. As will be shown, sex-selection abortion
presents interests on the part of the woman and the state that are
fundamentally different from those balanced by the Roe Court.
1. The woman's interests.
The woman's interests in obtaining an abortion may be measured
in at least three ways:
(1) by what she is willing to endure to avoid pregnancy and birth;
(2) by the likelihood that she will regret giving birth; and
(3) by the likelihood she will regret having obtained a successful
abortion.
There is little doubt that, using any of these measures, a woman
faced with an unwanted pregnancy has a far weightier interest in ob-
taining an abortion than a woman who wants only to preselect her
child's sex.
First, a woman with an unwanted pregnancy is likely to accept any
safe abortion-and would perhaps risk an unsafe one, while a woman
wanting a child of a certain gender wants a safe abortion only if she
can be reasonably sure that she has accurately determined the sex of
the fetus. Thus, the latter will take fewer chances in her search for
an abortion than the woman who seeks to avoid parenting altogether.
Conversely, a woman seeking a sex-selection abortion has far less
to lose if she is denied an abortion than did Jane Roe. A woman
seeking an abortion only to determine the sex of her future child
would clearly be willing to suffer the discomfort and inconvenience
of pregnancy, to endure the pain of childbirth, and to raise the child.
She is not only emotionally prepared for parenthood, she is also more
likely to be prepared to make the necessary financial expenditures.
Jane Roe, on the other hand, was unmarried133 and did not want to
give birth at all, regardless of the gender or condition of the fetus. 34
132. Id. at 162-64.
133. Id. at 120.
134. Jane Roe became pregnant through rape and never saw the child again after
leaving the hospital. F. FRIENDLY & M. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE
BALANCE 202-04 (1984). It is reasonable to infer that she would not have wanted to
give birth regardless of these circumstances.
She would bear the child only if she were unable to obtain an abor-
tion, but she clearly had no plans to raise the child.135The respective probabilities that these women would be willing to
carry their fetuses to term are telling in themselves. There is a fifty
percent chance that a woman who does not know the gender of her
fetus and is denied a sex-selection abortion would be disappointed or
regretful should she bring the fetus to term. 136 But it is virtually cer-
tain that a woman with an unwanted pregnancy would be disap-
pointed and regretful if required to complete the pregnancy.
Finally, there is the likelihood that these women will regret having
obtained an abortion. There is only a small probability that a woman
like Jane Roe would regret it because she was confronted with an un-
wanted pregnancy. There is a far greater probability, however, that a
woman seeking a sex-selection abortion would regret having an abor-
tion, because the fetus was not entirely unwanted. That is, the wo-
man would realize there is a certain probability that she may be
prevented from giving birth to a normal child of the desired gender
at a later time. Since she, unlike Jane Roe, is prepared to raise the
child, there would be a greater likelihood of regret over the abortion
decision later.
In short, a woman seeking a sex-selection abortion would be more
likely to regret having obtained a "blind" abortion, is more selective
about the conditions under which she will agree to one, and has far
less to lose from denial of an abortion than a woman with an un-
wanted pregnancy. While a woman with an unwanted pregnancy
may be desperate and willing to seek a "back-alley" abortion, it
seems doubtful that many women seeking sex-selection abortions
would settle for this. These radically different attitudes toward abor-
tion clearly demonstrate that a woman seeking to control the gender
of her children has a far less weighty interest in obtaining an abor-
tion than does a woman in the position of Jane Roe.
2. The state's interest.
Not only do the two women discussed above have radically differ-
ent attitudes toward the outcomes of their pregnancies, but the state
135. Jane Roe claimed she could not afford to obtain an abortion in another state.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 120. She had no job skills. P. BABBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 165
(1982). Given her meager financial circumstances and her poor prospects for a signifi-
cant income, it is unlikely she harbored any plans to raise the child. In any event, she
did not raise it.
136. Presumably, if a woman who desired a firstborn male delivered a male child,
she would be satisfied with this result. However, if she delivered a female, she would
be presumably disappointed relative to the position she would have obtained if she had
delivered a male. Each individual woman's chances of delivering a particular gender
are extremely speculative, but for purposes of illustrating the point, a 50% standard is
sufficient. See THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 10, at 279.
[Vol. 15: 295, 1988] Sex-Selection Abortion
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
has radically different interests at stake in imposing regulations on
those respective outcomes. The differing state interests stem from
the different ramifications the respective terminations of the
pregnancies have for society. If Jane Roe terminates her preg-
nancy-even at public expense-society's expense is minimal from a
cost-benefit point of view, even if all similarly situated women were
to follow her example. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis might well show
that society is actually better off paying for the termination of un-
wanted pregnancies than providing for the care of unwanted chil-
dren, or enduring the other likely effects of carrying unwanted
pregnancies to term, such as child abuse and juvenile crime. To be
sure, there may be anguish on the part of some members of society
("pro-lifers") who regard fetal life as equivalent to any other human
life, and these effects must be weighed in the balance. Offending the
sensibilities of bystanders, however, is appropriately given greater
weight than the effects on participants only in cases in which partici-
pants have no legitimate stake in pursuing the activity. For example,
legislators have given great weight to the effects on bystanders in en-
acting prohibitions on cruelty to animals, because torturers of ani-
mals have no legitimate claim to the outcome of the cruelty. Women
seeking to rid themselves of an unwanted pregnancy surely have a le-
gitimate claim to do so, apart from the controversial question of
whether they have a right to kill the fetus. At most, the example of
animal cruelty laws shows that fetuses have a right to painless abor-
tions. The woman's interest remains far more substantial than that
of the sensibilities of antiabortionist bystanders.
Of course, if "pro-lifers" are correct in asserting that fetal life is
equally as valuable as other human life, the costs of abortion on de-
mand are much higher than the Court has been willing to admit.
Abortion on demand would amount to a harsh form of age discrimi-
nation unprotected by federal law. The Court, however, denied in
Roe v. Wade that non-viable fetuses are "persons" for fourteenth
amendment purposes.137 This finding considerably simplifies the
analysis.
Perhaps the Supreme Court in Roe had this sort of analysis in
mind when it recognized only two state interests, protection of fetal
life and preservation of maternal health.138 It was undoubtedly this
refusal to classify non-viable fetuses as persons which permitted the
137. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-58.
138. Id. at 162.
Court to dismiss protection of fetal life as a justification sufficient to
warrant the imposition of a blanket ban on abortion.139 The Court
recognized that in order to justify a blanket ban, it would have to
adopt "one theory of life"'140 and dismiss all other views of the signifi-
cance of fetal life. The Court may have felt that the palpable social
effects of forcing women to carry unwanted fetuses to term were too
overwhelming a price to pay to spare those who equate fetal life with
post-natal human life, the anguish they would otherwise experience.
In other words, the Court viewed the hurt experienced by "pro-lif-
ers" as a much smaller price to pay than the pain, trauma, and other
ill effects that pregnant women and their offspring must pay. There-
fore, it might be said that granting a woman with an unwanted preg-
nancy her request for an abortion has a minimal utilitarian impact on
society.
Even if the "pro-life" premise that fetal life is sacred is rejected,
the state's interest in regulating sex-selection abortion outweighs the
state interests in regulating the abortion of unwanted pregnancies.
In addition to the concern for fetal life and the ill effects of forcing
women to carry to term, there are the governmental interests in
achieving equal opportunity between the sexes and maintaining a
balanced proportion of sexes in the population. Granting requests for
sex-selection abortions today would undoubtedly result in large num-
bers of requests in the future, and in the births of more sons and
more firstborn sons. Whereas Jane Roe's abortion, like any termina-
tion of an unwanted pregnancy, may be said to have affected only
those acquainted with or biologically related to her, the effects of
sex-selection abortions radiate out beyond those affected by termina-
tions of unwanted pregnancies. Denying requests for sex-selection
abortions would thus have beneficial effects that go beyond relieving
the anxieties of those who hold fetal life sacred. In addition, future
generations of women would likely be spared being the victims of
sexual harassment, assault, job discrimination, and other more subtle
forms of oppression.
3. Weighing these interests in the balance.
Regardless of how important the state's interests in protecting fetal
life and maternal health are, clearly the state protects other interests
'in denying sex-selection abortions. Conversely, a woman seeking to
obtain such an abortion has interests even narrower than those of
Jane Roe. Whereas the Roe Court had to weigh Jane Roe's unwill-
ingness to be a parent against the state's concern for her health and
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the life of the fetus,141 a court facing a challenge to a statute prohibit-
ing sex-selection abortion would have to weigh the woman's desire to
give birth to and raise to adulthood a child of her chosen gender,
against the state's concerns for her health, fetal life, and the adverse
impact on future generations of women. Should the Court ever be
faced with a state statute banning only sex-selection abortions, the
Court could advance convincing reasons for reaching a result differ-
ent from that reached when it confronted the blanket ban on abor-
tion in Roe v. Wade.
B. Equal Protection Challenges to a Prohibition Statute
A state ban on sex-selection abortion would be certain to face a
more subtle challenge based on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The equal protection clause protects individ-
uals from discrimination due to their membership in a disadvantaged
group. 142 Laws that discriminate on the basis of race are subject to
"strict scrutiny."1 43 Those that discriminate on the basis of sex, how-
ever, are currently subject to "intermediate scrutiny."144 That is,
"classification by gender must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."145
A successful equal protection challenge of a sex-selection abortion
prohibition statute would entail proving that the statute's purpose is
to burden women exclusively, and either that the statute achieves no
important governmental objective or that there is no substantial rela-
tion between the prohibition and the attainment of that objective.
The discussion which follows will show that a ban on sex-selection
abortion cannot be faulted on any of these grounds. The chief reason
why a prohibition statute would survive an equal protection attack is
because it burdens women disproportionately more than men in or-
der to alleviate future discrimination and oppression of women. 46
141. See id. at 164.
142. See generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.1 at 314-15.
143. Id. § 18.3 at 324-25.
144. Id.
145. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (involving challenge to statute which
favored females by allowing vendors of nonintoxicating 3.2 percent beer to serve wo-
men between the ages of 18-21 years, but to no male patron under the age of 21 years).
146. This is a variant of benign sex discrimination because it proposes to compen-
sate females, although the means are different from traditional benign sex discrimina-
tion which burdens males proportionately more than females. The notion of
burdening some females to benefit others is similar to the "integration defense" a
housing developer can invoke against a charge of violating Title VIII of the Fair Hous-
No better governmental objective could be advanced for a statute
with a disproportionate impact on one of the sexes than that of




If a gender-neutral prohibition statute is facially neutral, in that it
does not appear that it would focus solely on women, then a person
litigating an equal protection challenge would have to show either
that the statute was applied in a discriminatory manner or that it was
merely a pretext for oppressing women.148 The Supreme Court made
it clear in Geduldig v. Aiello149 that classifications based on preg-
nancy are not.gender-based, since they distinguish between pregnant
women and other nonpregnant people, and not solely between wo-
men and men.15 0 A prohibition statute designed and enforced to pun-
ish all persons seeking to determine the gender of their children-as
opposed to the purpose of generally punishing women, pregnant or
not-could pass constitutional muster.
First, the statute could be supplemented with a provision rendering
fathers criminally liable for failing to object to a mother's decision to
abort. Second, a statute prohibiting pregnant "persons" (or some
other synonym)-not just pregnant "women"-from obtaining sex-se-
lection abortions might also survive equal protection attack, since the
statute would leave open the theoretical possibility that pregnant
males could be prosecuted thereunder. A fetus in New Zealand de-
ing Act. Where a developer has reserved a certain percentage of units for members of
a minority group, minority persons can legitimately be denied housing once the quota
is met, lest the racial integration that exists be destroyed. Otero v. New York City
Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1132-37 (2d Cir. 1973). This is not, strictly speaking, be-
nign racial discrimination, since the minority bears the burden, but the purpose is to
benefit minorities by promoting integrated housing.
147. The Court has upheld preferential treatment of women in cases where the dis-
parate treatment compensates for past discrimination against women. E.g., Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (social security provision allowing women to compute
their benefits using a more favorable formula than that which men could use); Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (federal statute granting longer tenure to female
naval "line" officers.before discharge); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (property
tax exemption for widows but not widowers). The Court has also upheld classifica-
tions according to gender when they advance some other important state interest. See,
e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (exemption of females from military draft
registration); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) ("statutory rape" de-
fined to protect women only). The state interests in the second set of cases are diffi-
cult to distinguish from overly protective legislation which the Court regards as
perpetuating stereotypes. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (nursing school's claim that female-only admissions policy helped compensate
women for past discrimination rejected as perpetuating stereotypes).
148. See 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.4 at 344.
149. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
150. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
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veloped to full term from a fertilized egg that lodged in a woman's
abdomen on her bowel.151 It is theoretically possible that the same
result could occur in a man's body.152
Both the careful wording of the statute and the medical possibility
of male pregnancy serve as effective responses to the contention that
statutes which discriminate between pregnant and nonpregnant peo-
ple violate the equal protection clause. That is, critics of the Court
have argued that laws protecting fetuses violate equal protection be-
cause only "women can suffer the great intrusions of such laws, for
only women have the ability to bear children."153 However, a prohi-
bition statute does not protect fetuses as much as it protects future
generations of women. Moreover, a prohibition statute does not vio-
late equal protection since it may also intrude on the lives of men,
not only as codefendants, but possibly as sole defendants in the
future.
This argument does not deny that women would undoubtedly be
punished under a prohibition statute in far greater numbers than
would men. The Supreme Court, however, could find precedent with
which to counter such an equal protection attack in Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Fenney,154 in which a state statute
giving a lifetime preference to veterans in civil service jobs had a se-
verely disparate impact on women. The Court nevertheless held the
legislation to be a noninvidious, neutral classification intended to aid
all veterans, and not merely to prefer men over women.155 It is un-
likely, therefore, that the United States Supreme Court would find
purposeful discrimination in a gender-neutral prohibition statute.
2. The governmental objective.
Although it is unlikely that a court would find purposeful discrimi-
nation in a gender-neutral prohibition statute, it would surely find a
discriminatory intent embodied in a sex-specific prohibition statute.
Once that finding were made, there would be the further question of
whether the purpose of the statute-reducing future discrimination
151. Teresi & McAuliffe, Male Pregnancy, OMNI, Dec. 1985, at 51, 52.
152. Id.
153. Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 620 (1986).
154. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
155. Id. at 274-80. The Court allowed for the possibility, not raised in this case, that
discriminatory intent could be established by showing that a facially neutral rule nev-
ertheless had a "gender-biased" nature or an impact so adverse it must have been in-
tended. Id. at 276.
against and oppression of women156 -is important enough to enable
the statute to survive an equal protection challenge.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,157 Justice
O'Connor emphasized the importance of the governmental objective
of compensating women for past discrimination when faced with a
challenge to a state policy of admitting only women to a university
program.158 She could not understand, however, how refusing to ad-
mit men to Mississippi's School of Nursing for Women compensated
women for past discrimination in the nursing profession. 159 Never-
theless, Hogan demonstrated that compensating women for past dis-
crimination may be in principle a sufficiently important
governmental objective to justify a policy of gender discrimination.
The further question Hogan raises but does not answer is whether
classifications based on gender are inherently suspect.160 If the Court
should rule in a future case that gender classifications are inherently
suspect, then, like racial classifications, they would be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. If such a ruling were issued, it is unclear
whether compensation for past sexual discrimination would be a suf-
ficiently weighty state interest to survive strict scrutiny.
3. The substantial relation analysis.
The most intriguing questions under equal protection analysis
would be whether the gender classification bears a substantial rela-
tion to an important governmental purpose; and, if strict scrutiny
should ever apply, whether the classification is narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest. Unfortunately, the Court has set out only
the necessary conditions of the substantial relation-those conditions
which, if not satisfied, render a relation insubstantial for equal pro-
tection purposes. In Hogan, for example, Justice O'Connor found the
relation between Mississippi's gender-based classification unsubstan-
tially related to its objective of compensating women for past discrim-
ination.161 In fact, her belief was that the single-sex admissions
policy actually reinforced the stereotype of nursing as "an exclusively
woman's job."162 Hogan thus shows that just because a state's poli-
cies profess to remedy past gender discrimination, there is no guaran-
tee they will pass the substantial relationship test.
156. See supra part II.A.l.b.
157. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
158. Id. at 728-29.
159. Id. at 729-30. "Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced by
women, M.U.W.'s Policy of excluding males . . . tends to perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job." Id. at 729. The Court did not decide
whether the classification under this statute involved a suspect class. Id.
160. Id. at 724 n.9.
161. Id. at 730.
162. Id. at 729.
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There is some question whether prohibition statutes would affect
sexual stereotypes. Whether gender-specific or -neutral, these stat-
utes would have the effect of discouraging couples from clinging to
the stereotypical ideal of having a family with firstborn sons. Never-
theless, there can be no serious question about whether a statute
punishing sex-selection abortion would prevent gender ratio imbal-
ances in the population and thereby relieve some oppression of wo-
men by maintaining their relative numbers. Similarly, a gender-
specific statute punishing women who abort normal female fetuses
after prenatal testing disclosed the gender of the fetus would help in-
crease the number of women in the future. The only controversial
question would be whether the statutes have any other markedly un-
desirable effects.
This question would be especially crucial to a prohibition statute
facing strict scrutiny, since the legislature would not have as much
leeway in achieving its ends at this level of review.163 Even so, there
would be little of which a reviewing court could complain. For exam-
ple, a gender-specific statute is narrowly drawn insofar as it permits
couples to abort normal male fetuses without fear of prosecution. A
gender-specific statute thus goes to the heart of the problem by at-
tacking male chauvinism, while a gender-neutral statute casts the net
more broadly and attacks sexist attitudes generally by punishing all
sex-selection abortions.
Legislators could improve the odds of an enactment's passing the
substantial relation test by stating in a preamble to the statute the
precise ends which the enactment is designed to achieve. They
should take care, however, not to claim that the statute will accom-
plish more than is necessary. The sponsors should not, for example,
claim that a statute punishing abortions of normal female fetuses is
designed to discourage sexist attitudes, because the statute would be
underinclusive to the extent it leaves couples free to abort normal
male fetuses. Instead, they should state that the statute is designed
to prevent population imbalances of females to males and to offer
more opportunities to females in subsequent generations. On the
163. See generally 2 ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 18.3 at 324-26. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, White, and Douglas, in a plurality opinion, striking down
obstacles for dependency allowances offered only to servicewomen, argued that classi-
fications based on gender are "inherently suspect" and should be subjected to "strict
judicial scrutiny." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). On the other end
of the spectrum, some justices have argued that benign racial classifications are "inher-
ently suspect and presumptively invalid." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-26
(1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
other hand, legislators sponsoring a gender-neutral prohibition stat-
ute should mention more general goals, such as preventing imbal-
ances in sex ratios and combatting sexist stereotypes about the
family.
C. Summary
A prohibition statute would likely face constitutional challenges on
both privacy and equal protection grounds. Although a privacy chal-
lenge, based on Roe v. Wade, may seem formidable, a close examina-
tion of Roe would reveal that the state has a far stronger interest in
banning sex-selection abortions than it has in banning all abortions.
By prohibiting sex-selection abortions, the state spares future genera-
tions of women a good deal of misery, while no such benefits are en-
joyed from a blanket ban. Moreover, a woman seeking a sex-
selection abortion has much less at stake than Jane Roe, who was
faced with an entirely unwanted pregnancy. Given these competing
interests, the Roe Court would likely have found the balance
weighted in favor of the state and approved a ban on abortion for
gender selection.
A prohibition statute would also survive an equal protection chal-
lenge in gender-neutral form because it is facially non-discrimina-
tory. Even in its sex-specific form, its discriminatory effect is a
variant of benign discrimination. Furthermore, given the serious ef-
fects on women that would result from the absence of any restriction
on sex-selection abortion and the narrow scope of the ban imposed by
a prohibition statute of either kind, the prohibition statute would
likely be found to bear a substantial relation to an important govern-
mental purpose and thus survive equal protection attack.
V. REFLECTIONS ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Even though both nondisclosure statutes and prohibition statutes
would ultimately pass constitutional muster, advancing medical tech-
nology may introduce a new dimension into the debate. Should med-
ical science develop a preconception method of gender selection,
women could select the gender of their children prior to pregnancy.
Under such circumstances, abortion would be considered only if the
procedure went awry. Moreover, medical advances could allow a
couple to carry out the procedure of prenatal testing themselves,
which would eliminate the need for a physician's intervention. The
enforcement of any state prohibition on the use of such techniques
would be far more intrusive.
Advances in medicine could, however, proceed in another direction.
If gender selection became possible by using a unique manufactured
device, fewer constitutional issues would be raised by banning the
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manufacture and sale of such a device, although enforcement of the
ban could encounter practical difficulties.164 If, on the other hand,
there were no special device, then couples would need to obtain med-
ical information from their physicians to accomplish sex selection.
Any associated free speech and privacy objections could be defeated
by arguments similar to those raised to defend the nondisclosure stat-
ute: the information would be used only for unlawful activity and
would be "private" speech in any case. Therefore, a ban on medical
advice in selecting the sex of one's children would likely be found
constitutional.
By far the thorniest problem would involve the intrusiveness of en-
forcement of a ban on the utilization of gender selection techniques
in one's home. Such a ban would be at least as intrusive as judicial
recognition of a child's cause of action against its mother for negli-
gent prenatal behavior.165 Both intrude upon basic constitutional lib-
erty and privacy interests by forcing women to carry to term fetuses
they want to abort. It might even be argued that bans on the private
use of gender preselection techniques are more intrusive, since they
subject women to criminal sanctions, whereas granting children rem-
edies against their mothers for birth defects merely involves civil lia-
bility that may be covered by homeowner's insurance. 166 Where such
insurance coverage is available, a pregnant woman's conduct would
be only minimally affected by the prospect of suits alleging prenatal
negligence. The same cannot be said with respect to the threat of
criminal sanctions which would cause a woman either to resign her-
self to giving birth or to seek an illegal abortion.
There would, however, be important procedural differences be-
tween enforcing the duty to behave as a reasonable pregnant mother
and the duty to refrain from practicing unlawful gender selection.
The criminal sanction could be imposed only if the specific intent of
aborting an undesired fetus were shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
The duty to conduct oneself as a reasonable mother, on the other
hand, involves only a showing of negligence by a preponderance of
the evidence. Thus, even though the criminal sanction is more se-
vere, it is correspondingly more difficult to prove.
164. There would be no question of interference in the doctor-patient relationship.
There may, however, be a privacy problem; but unlike Griswold, Eisenstadt, or even
Roe, the government is not preventing women from avoiding conception or childbirth.
165. Note, supra note 153, at 614-15.
166. Schedler, Women's Reproductive Rights: Is There a Conflict with a Child's
Right to be Born Free from Defects?, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 357, 358 & n.4 (1986).
Moreover, the privacy problems of enforcement may be overesti-
mated. The decision most often cited in support of a broad constitu-
tional protection of individual freedom in one's home is Stanley v.
Georgia.167 But the Court has also upheld a Georgia sodomy statute
in Bowers v. Hardwick.168 The respondent there was charged with
committing the act of sodomy in the bedroom of his home. The en-
forcement problems in the case were similar to those presented in
Stanley. Justice White's majority opinion in Hardwick interpreted
Stanley as having protected a first amendment right to view porno-
graphic materials in one's home, but not a generalized right to do in
one's home what would otherwise be unprotected outside the
home.169 Indeed, Justice White cited Stanley for the proposition that
individuals have no protection from "victimless" crimes, such as the
possession of drugs or of stolen goods in one's home.170 The use of
gender-selection techniques in one's home would be comparable to
the drug-possession example since both practices have severe adverse
effects on those who do not consent. When individuals store drugs in
their homes, unconsenting bystanders are placed at risk in numerous
ways, including being the victims' of robberies performed to finance
drug purchases. With sex-selection techniques, other women whose
births did not result from the use of such techniques will be victims
and will be forced to pay the price of the unrestricted use of the tech-
niques. Restrictions in both cases are necessary to avoid this harm.
The Court would most likely find no constitutional difficulty raised
by the intrusiveness of these restrictions.
Two other Supreme Court decisions that might be cited in support
of the unconstitutionality of banning home use of the techniques are
Griswold v. Connecticut'7 ' and Eisenstadt v. Baird.172 These are
more persuasive precedents, since they elevated reproductive free-
dom to a constitutionally protected right. 73 However, the statutes in
Griswold and Eisenstadt differ from a proscription on the use of sex-
selection techniques in a fundamental way. Both Griswold and Ei-
senstadt protected the right to avoid procreation, while the prohibi-
tion at issue here would not affect that right. A prohibition statute
167. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (conviction of defendant for possession of pornographic ma-
terial in his home reversed).
168. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
169. Id. at 2846 (Georgia's sodomy statute upheld against equal protection chal-
lenge, as well as challenge on grounds of right to privacy).
170. Id. (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.l).
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
173. The Griswold Court referred to the right of privacy as being older than the
Bill of Rights itself, and held that it was implicit in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-84, 486. The Eisenstadt Court stated that
the right to privacy meant nothing if it did not insulate from governmental intrusion
the decision "to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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would still leave women free to regulate their fertility or the odds of
conception; they simply would be forbidden from manipulating the
odds of conceiving a fetus of a certain sex. Such a prohibition does
not really affect their right to bring to term any fetus they choose,
nor to abort a fetus with defects. This is not to deny that there is an
inherent element of intrusiveness in such a statute. It is clear, how-
ever, that a statute prohibiting sex-selection abortion does not in-
trude on the core of procreative rights.
Even granting, however, that such a ban would impinge on a wo-
man's procreative right as protected in Griswold, the Court would
most likely approve the ban as narrowly advancing a compelling state
interest. Safeguarding women from discrimination would be equally
as compelling in the context of reproductive rights as it is in privacy
and free speech questions. Moreover, specific threats to the future
equal opportunity for women are created by those couples who at-
tempt to determine the gender of their children. Since the statute
would target these couples only, it would be as narrowly tailored as
possible to effectuate the statute's legitimate governmental
objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
There will be certain recurring constitutional issues surrounding
any prohibitions on gender preselection of children, regardless of the
degree of advancement of the associated medical technology.
Whether there will be public impetus to enact such prohibitions will
depend on the degree to which the factual picture developed at the
outset of this article is accurate, as well as the extent to which legis-
lators will seek to avoid the evils that might result. The following is
a summary of the factual assumptions and the constitutional issues
that bans on sex-selection abortion would raise.
First, present attitudes of prospective American parents about the
sex of their future children show that couples are likely to utilize the
combination of prenatal testing and abortion on demand to pre-deter-
mine the gender of their children. Many of them are also likely to
have firstborn sons followed by daughters. As a result, there may
very well be a far greater proportion of males to females in the popu-
lation, as well as absolute declines in the female population. Assum-
ing this, the resultant increase in male children may lead to more
crime (especially rape and sexual assault and increased prostitution)
and job discrimination against women.
To avoid this, states should consider denying pregnant women in-
formation about the sex of the fetuses they carry, as well as outlaw-
ing abortion for sex selection purposes. Both measures would
constitute a variant of benign sex discrimination since women in the
present generation would suffer restrictions on their reproductive
rights to relieve oppression on future generations of females.
Both measures would face serious but not insuperable constitu-
tional challenges. Any statute restricting the flow of information be-
tween a doctor and patient would face both privacy and free speech
objections. But the flow of factual information from doctor to pa-
tient, as opposed to information imbued with medical generalizations,
does not fall into the constitutionally protected area of privacy. A
doctor's communication of the gender of the fetus to a mother as it
relates to the procurement of an illegal sex-selection abortion would
accordingly be unprotected by the first amendment.
A statute prohibiting women from obtaining sex-selection abor-
tions would also be likely to encounter privacy objections, largely on
the basis of Roe's invalidation of blanket bans on abortion. But a
careful reading of Roe reveals that the state's interest in prohibiting
sex-selection abortions is much more compelling than Texas' interest
in prohibiting abortions in Roe v. Wade.174 Conversely, the woman's
interest in securing a sex-selection abortion is less serious than that
of a woman in the position of Jane Roe.
An equal protection argument could also be raised against sex-se-
lection abortion. But the Court's treatment of such programs as vet-
erans' benefits shows that, absent evidence of purposeful
discrimination, the fact that women alone are disadvantaged under a
statute will not be enough to invalidate it. Moreover, medical tech-
nology is rapidly developing the possibility of male pregnancy.
Although this may prove to be exceedingly rare and expensive, a leg-
islature familiar with the possibility could show that the legislators
envisioned the possible punishment of males as well as females, and
thus had no discriminatory intent.
In spite of this, a court might find discriminatory intent when
faced with a sex-specific prohibition statute. However, a reviewing
court would likely find that the discriminatory purpose of such a
statute bears a substantial; relation to the important governmental
purpose of either preventing imbalanced sex ratios in the population
or decreasing future oppression of women. Legislators could improve
the chances of such a finding by prefacing the statute with a nar-
rowly drawn statement of legislative purpose.
Of course, as we have just seen, advances in medical science may
174. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155.
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introduce a complication into this debate by uncovering a method of
sex predetermination that does not require the obtaining of an abor-
tion. But even if no assistance from a physician were required, the
prevention of oppression of women would still likely constitute a
state interest compelling enough to overcome privacy objections, and
the means used would be as narrow as they could be to prevent popu-
lation imbalances. Thus, the prohibition of home-use sex-selection
techniques would also likely be constitutional.

